

In the plan of the attack, and in all measures and arrangements which could conduce to its success, Colonel Ochterlony evinced his usual judgment and ability.

Colonel Ochterlony's operations will continue to be directed against the enemy's supplies, and such of his new positions as may be found to be assailable.

Copy of a Letter from Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, K. C. B. to the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

ON the 27th I had the honour to report to you the arrival of the 2d battalion of the 7th Native Infantry and the eighteen-pounders in this camp.

Our position in view of the fort had compelled the enemy to bring their supplies from the eastward by circuitous routes; but my information led me to hope that the possession of three points in front of our right would entirely cut off their supplies from Billaspore, and generally from the interior. In consequence I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson to march as soon as it was dark on the night of the 27th, and dislodge the enemy from the stockades they had erected on two of those points, and to occupy and maintain a third which they had neglected.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson had with him fourteen companies, two six-pounders and two howitzers of the mountain train, and a force of irregulars amounting to at least a thousand, but calculated at twelve hundred matchlocks. From the badness of the road, or rather foot-paths, and the great difficulties encountered, it was not till a late hour in the morning of the 28th that Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson reached the first point he was instructed to attack, and that was found so inaccessible, and so very much stronger than my information had given me reason to expect, that he very judiciously determined not to risk the chance of an instantaneous assault; but to make use of his artillery. His letter, which I have the honour to inclose, together with a copy of my instructions, details his proceedings from that date, and renders it only necessary for me to express my approbation of Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson's conduct, and entire satisfaction with that of the detachment in general.

It would, however, be unjust not to mention, that the reports I received from Lieutenant Lawtie, Engineer, of the very great labour and fatigue sustained with cheerfulness by the pioneers, induced me to express to Captain Baines, Lieutenant Armstrong, and their Officers, who set them the meritorious example, my particular thanks, and to send a pecuniary donation to the men.

Lieutenant Lawtie, with his accustomed zeal, accompanied the detachment, and on this as on every occasion, deserves my highest consideration; from him I have the honour to transmit a slight sketch of the ground and point of attack.

It remains only to add, that the enemy no sooner perceived the movement to the right, and contemplated its obvious object, than they evacuated all their stockades, but the two small redoubts immediately under the fort, and risked the attempt which Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson has detailed,

and on its unsuccessful issue, retired to Munghooka Dhar, where he is now assembled with his whole force, the right covered by the stockades which I had intended to attack, and their left resting on or towards the fort of Taragush.

Apprehending that the enemy might venture a second, I directed Lieutenant Colonel Lyons and the second battalion of the 7th, with two six-pounders, to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, in the hope of preventing it, or rendering it ineffectual. They have, however, remained stationary since their repulse.

I have, &c.

D. OCHTERLONY, Major-Gen.
Camp Nehr, Dec. 31, 1814.

Report from Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson to Major-General Ochterlony, inclosed in the preceding.

SIR,

AGREEABLY to your instructions, I have the honour to report, that after dusk on the evening of the 27th I commenced my march towards these heights with the light battalion and eight companies of the 2d battalion 3d regiment, native infantry, two six pounders, and a mountain train of two light howitzers. Although the night was extremely favourable, the whole of the artillery did not reach the opposite side of the ridge of hills, about one coss below Deboo-kat Jobby, until past eight o'clock in the morning of the 28th. I then advanced up the face of the hill with the light battalion and four companies of the 2d battalion 3d regiment, to gain possession of the ridge on my left, immediately opposite to the enemy's stone stockade; from this ridge, the stockade is about seven hundred yards, with four different heights intervening.

The enemy having come out so far as the nearest hill to the ridge, began to open a fire of matchlocks upon our party as they proceeded up the heights. On our gaining possession of a high part of the ridge, the enemy evacuated their position upon the opposite hill, and being instantaneously pursued by our troops, they fled successively over the whole of the hills between the ridge and their stockade, which appearing to me too strong to attempt without the assistance of our guns, I resolved to wait until the artillery came up.

The six-pounders opened upon the place about four o'clock P. M. and I was in hopes that as the wall appeared to be composed only of loose stones, it might have been laid open before dusk; but after firing for about an hour, from a distance of about five hundred yards, only a small part of the wall came down.

Having resolved to move the battery to a nearer distance the following morning, the pioneers were employed during the day in making fascines and gabions for that purpose.

About a quarter of an hour, however, before sun-rise the following morning (the 29th) the enemy came down in great numbers from the Mungoo-kat Dhar, with an apparent intention of forcing my position on the ridge, and also turning my left, so as to surround it. I am happy to add, that, in consequence of the warm reception they