



SUPPLEMENT

TO

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India-Board, Whitehall, Aug. 16, 1815.

DISPATCHES, dated Fort-William, 25th January 1815, together with their inclosures, of which the following are extracts, have been received at the East India-House, from the Vice-President in Council.

WE have the honour to transmit to your Honourable Court copies of documents, in continuation of the subject of our address of the 27th ultimo, relative to the operations of the war with the state of Nepal.

The successful resistance which the enemy has hitherto opposed to the advance of the divisions of Majors-General Wood and Massey, and the disasters which have occurred in the division commanded by Major-General Martinell, will be a subject of deep regret to your Honourable Court; but your Honourable Court will derive great satisfaction from the success which has hitherto attended the operations of the division under the command of Major-General Ochterlony.

Extract of a Letter from the Adjutant-General to the Secretary to Government, dated Head-Quarters, Moradabad, December 10, 1814, relative to the Operations of the 2d Division of the Field-Army, under the temporary Command of Colonel Mawby.

MY last transmission of dispatches from the officer commanding the troops in the Dhoon announced the evacuation of the fort of Kalunga on the morning of the 30th ultimo.

The garrison is now known to have suffered

most severely from the fire of the British artillery, and particularly from the shells thrown from the mortars. The place was found crowded with dead and wounded, the enemy was unable to carry off in his precipitate flight, during the course of which his whole numbers were, with a very limited exception, either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, by the activity and gallantry of the different detachments which had been very judiciously placed by Colonel Mawby, to intercept his retreat.

Butbudder Sing, the Killedar, effected his escape with about seventy followers, with whom he took post on a hill, at some distance from the British camp, where he was joined by three hundred Goorkhas, intended as a reinforcement for the garrison of Kalunga; and who had been several days seen hovering in the mountains. Colonel Mawby determined to dislodge them from this position, and selected Major Ludlow for the conduct of this service, which was most ably and successfully accomplished by that officer.

The conduct of Major Ludlow deserves, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, to be brought to the particular notice of his Lordship, not only as distinguished in this affair, but throughout the whole of the service in the Dhoon: at the arduous and unfortunate commencement of it, his gallantry and exertions were most conspicuous, and it is known attracted the applause of the illustrious Commander, who fell on that lamented occasion. Since that period Major Ludlow has been employed on every service of difficulty and danger that has occurred, and invariably conducted himself with eminent courage, judgement, and zeal.

The officers who served under Major Ludlow in the attack of Bulbudder Sing's position are also entitled to particular notice and commendation; and His Excellency accordingly begs leave to name the following officers, as deserving to be honoured with the approbation of Government: Captain Bucke, commanding the light battalion, in the absence of Major Wilson; Ensigns Wilson, Richmond, and Turner, doing duty with that battalion. The arduous and difficult nature of the service, the fatigues and privations the troops had for some time undergone, and the strength of the enemy's position, demanded exemplary exertions of activity, zeal, and personal bravery from the European officers; and they appear to have been made on this occasion with a spirit and alacrity becoming British officers.

It will be satisfactory to the Government to observe, that in this rencontre, (the first which has taken place between the Sepoys and the Goorkah troops since the successful resistance of the latter from the walls of their forts) our native infantry, animated by the example and under the guidance of their European officers, have maintained their accustomed superiority in close conflict with an enemy of determined courage, aided by the natural strength of his position.

The fall of Kalunga, and the impression produced by the ultimate fate of the garrison, notwithstanding its protracted and gallant resistance, has been attended with the most beneficial consequences. The confidence that had been created by the events before Kalunga has abated; and the spirit of insurrection against the Goorkah tyranny, which the same events had repressed, has now decidedly manifested itself.

A very strongly stockaded position which the enemy occupied on the heights above the town of Calsia was precipitately abandoned, after a feeble resistance, on the advance of a small detachment sent against it on the 28th ultimo, by Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter, under the command of Captain East, of the 1st battalion of 17th native infantry, accompanied by a party of irregulars, which had been collected in the country by Mr. Fraser, with his usual indefatigable zeal in the public service.

The dispatch from Colonel Mawby, under date the 7th instant, will apprise the Governor-General of the evacuation of the strong fort of Baraut, situated on one side of those high mountains, which, rising in continuous masses from the north-eastern boundary of the valley of the Dhoon, extend to the great Himmalcheh range. The possession of this place is of great importance, commanding not only the district of Janisur, lying between the Jumna and Touse Rivers, but one of the enemy's main communications between his western army, under Ummeer Sing, and the countries held in subjection by its presence, and the dominions of Nepaul east of the Ganges. This event appears to have been accelerated by the defection of the headlandholders and inhabitants of the country. The post of Lackerghaut on the Ganges, where it forms the eastern limit of the valley of the Dhoon, and by which the enemy's direct and principal communication with Ummeer Sing's army was maintained before the British troops entered the valley, is in possession of one of our detachments, which com-

pletes the occupation of the Dhoon, and of the principal passes leading into it.

The occupation of this valley formed the earliest object of the Commander in Chief's attention in the plan which His Excellency had resolved to adopt for the campaign to the westward; because it necessarily cut off the lower, most direct, and most frequented line of communication between the capital and the eastern dominions of Fepaul, and its army and conquered provinces west of the Jumna and Touse Rivers; and the British authority once established in the valley, posts could have been extended from thence along those rivers to a distance sufficient to deprive Ummeer Sing of his middle line of communication, and to force him, on the event of his being compelled, or finding it expedient to abandon his western conquests, to seek a retreat by the only line for it which would then be left him, along the foot of the snowy mountains. The unfortunate events before Kalunga retarded, and for a time completely frustrated, the views of the Commander in Chief, and deprived the 3d division of the army, under Colonel Ochterlony, of the support and co-operation it was to derive from the 2d division after the occupation of the Dhoon, in a combined attack on the Goorkah power and possessions in Sirmoor. The fall of Kalunga, the secure occupation of the Dhoon, and the expulsion of the enemy, which is stated to be complete, from the districts lying between the Rivers Touse and Jumna, have in part accomplished the objects of the campaign in that quarter, and led to the immediate resumption of the original plan of operations intended to be pursued to the westward of the Jumna.

The battering train was to have left Deyrah on the 6th instant, and it was expected the remainder of the division would descend the Timley Pass on the 8th or 9th on its route to Nahan, which the Commander in Chief has ordered should be through the protected Seikh country and the Muckunda pass, with a view to avoid the difficult pass of Guttansun, and the defiles leading directly from the Kaerdar valley towards Nahan.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of a Detachment of the Field Army commanded by Colonel Mawby during the Siege of Kalunga and subsequent Attack on Bulbudder Sing, from the 25th of November 1814 to the 2d December, both inclusive.

25th November 1814.

53d Foot—1 serjeant killed; 2 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 6th Native Infantry—1 rank and file wounded.

Pioneers—1 serjeant wounded.

26th November 1814.

Foot Artillery—2 mattrasses wounded.

53d Foot—1 rank and file killed.

1st Batt. 6th Native Infantry—3 rank and file killed.

1st Batt. 7th Native Infantry—1 rank and file killed.

27th November 1814.

Horse Artillery—1 lieutenant, 1 gunner, 6 mattrasses, 2 gun lascars, wounded.

Foot Artillery—3 mattrasses, 2 golaundauze, 1 gun lascar, 1 driver, 1 magazine man, wounded.
 53d Foot—1 lieutenant, 16 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 15 serjeants, 2 drummers, 183 rank and file, 3 bheestees, wounded; 1 bheestee missing.
 1st Batt. 6th Native Infantry—1 captain, 9 rank and file, killed; 2 native commissioned officers, 3 havildars and serjeants, 1 drummer, 50 rank and file, wounded.
 1st Batt. 7th Native Infantry—1 native commissioned officer, 1 serjeant, 7 rank and file, killed; 1 native commissioned officer, 7 serjeants, 65 rank and file, wounded.
 1st Batt. 13th Native Infantry—1 lieutenant, 4 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 3 native commissioned officers, 6 serjeants, 1 drummer, 58 rank and file, wounded.
 Pioneers—8 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

30th November 1814.

1st Batt. 13th Native Infantry—1 rank and file wounded.
 1st Batt. 6th Native Infantry—1 rank and file wounded.

2d December 1814.

Light Battalion—1 captain, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 15 rank and file, wounded.

Total of killed and wounded—1 major, 5 captains, 6 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 7 native commissioned officers, 35 havildars and serjeants, 4 drummers, 425 rank and file, 1 gunner, 11 mattrasses, 2 golaundauze, 4 gun lascars, 1 driver, 4 bheesties, 1 magazine man.

Names of Officers killed and wounded.

Killed.

53d Foot—Lieutenant Harrington.
 1st Batt. 6th Native Infantry—Captain Campbell.
 1st Batt. 13th Native Infantry.—Lieutenant Cunningham.

Wounded.

Horse Artillery—Lieutenant J. W. J. B. Luxford (since dead).
 53d Foot—Major Ingleby, slightly; Captain Stone, severely; Lieutenant Horsely, severely; Lieutenant Greene, slightly; Lieutenant Brodie, severely; Ensign Aufreze, severely.
 1st Batt. 13th Native Infantry—Captain Blake, severely.
 Light Battalion—Captain Bucke, severely; Ensign and Adjutant Richmond, slightly.

Copy of a Letter from Major-General Sir Gabriel Martindell, K. C. B. commanding the Second Division of the Field Army, dated Camp Noginund, December 20, 1814, to the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

WITH reference to my letter, dispatched by express this morning, I have now the honour to inform you, that Major Ludlow took possession of Nahun at one o'clock to-day.

I have, &c.

G. MARTINDELL, Major-General,
 commanding detachment.

Camp, Noginund, December 20, 1814.

Extract of a Letter from Major-General Sir Gabriel Martindell, K. C. B. dated Camp, at Nahun, December 27, 1814.

IT is with unfeigned regret that I have to report to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the failure of an attack made this morning on a stockade, about a mile west of the fort of Jumpta, and which was planned with the double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position, and cutting off their supply of water, which it commanded.

From every information I possessed, together with what Major Ludlow, who commanded at Nahun from the 20th instant, had been able to obtain, and the previous local knowledge of Major Richards, I formed the plan of a combined attack. One column was commanded by Major Ludlow, who was directed to proceed to the left of the fort, whilst Major Richards, with another column, was to make a detour to the right, and take up a position on the other side of the fort, by which means I had every expectation of completely depriving the enemy of their watering places. The columns I made so strong as to be ample for the object in view; and I derive some satisfaction from the assurances, that both Majors Ludlow and Richards thought them sufficient.

It was calculated that both columns should march so as to reach their respective points of attack considerably before day-break; but it is much to be regretted, that Major Ludlow's column did not arrive at its position till long after that time, it was of course perceived by the enemy, who took every advantage of the discovery.

Major Ludlow reports, that he had at first the most flattering hopes of complete success, the enemy being driven from his advanced position, and compelled to retire into his stockade; but the Gorkahs here took advantage of a brave but ill-timed dash of the column, which Major Ludlow endeavoured in vain to restrain; and, after an arduous conflict, in which I fear our loss is great, (but I am at present unable to detail it), the column was obliged to retreat.

The slaughter of the enemy, Major Ludlow states, to be very great, and he speaks in the highest terms of the gallant exertions of the officers and men under his command. Much as I deplore this failure, I have consolation in thinking, that it has not tarnished the British arms.

N. B. The list of the casualties is not published, having, in subsequent accounts, been stated to be incorrect.

Copy of a Letter from Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, K. C. B. commanding the Third Division, to the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that the movement of the reserve, to cut off the supplies of the enemy, has induced him to evacuate all the stockades except the two immediately under the fort. He made a very bold and spirited attempt on the reserve this morning, but was repulsed to a distance, but I anticipate another in the course of

the night or to-morrow morning, and have in consequence reinforced the reserve with the 2d battalion of the 7th, the strongest in the the lines; and two six-pounders are going off at the moment I am writing.

I cannot at present enter into any particular details, but hope to be able to give you satisfactory accounts by express in the course of the morrow.

I have, &c.

D. OCHTERLONY.

Camp, half-past Four P. M. December 29, 1814.

The Goorkahs, in the stockade of Debooka Teiba, though surrounded, have not yet surrendered. I have not an official report, but my Hirkarrah informs me the people in the stockade have surrendered.

List of killed and wounded of Colonel Thompson's Detachment, 29th December 1815.

Light Infantry Battalion—1 havildar, 1 naick, 2 sepoy, killed; 1 havildar, 2 naicks, 18 sepoy, wounded.

2d Batt. 3d Native Infantry—5 sepoy killed; 2 havildars, 2 naicks, 19 sepoy, wounded.

Total—1 havildar, 1 naick, 7 sepoy, killed; 3 havildars, 4 naicks, 37 sepoy, wounded.

Copy of a Letter from Major-General John Sullivan Wood, commanding a Division of the Field Army, to the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report to you, that the plan of operations, contained in my letter of the 1st January, was postponed that evening until the 3d instant, in consequence of the information I then received, contrary to all previous representations, that no water could be obtained nearer the fort (the name of which is now discovered to be Mujcote) than Mahapore, being a distance of three miles. On the 2d instant, arrangements were made with the Commissariat for the carriage of water, for the Europeans and Mussulmen in leathern bags, and for the Hindoos in pots; and it was resolved to establish entrenched posts at Mahapore and Ramchae, a high ground near the fort, and to place a detachment at Paharea, a peak about half way between the two former, for the purpose of keeping up the communication. Thus my detachment was unavoidably to be divided into four parts, if it succeeded in carrying the successive steep narrow and woody peaks, which form the outline of the whole ridge west of Mujcote. In the evening however this plan was abandoned, in consequence of the receipt of fresh intelligence brought by two spies sent by the Rajah Ruttun Sing, which described the road along the ridge as rendered altogether impracticable, and from the advice and information of a Bramin Kauckunnuddee Searree, a native of the hills, but for many years past resident in Goruckpore and attached to the Rajah. This man, after insisting on the threatening nature of the difficulties presented by the Mahapore Hill, which were abundantly obvious, recommended that

the detachment should cross the Tenavee, occupy Bupunulpore, about ten miles from Simlar, and, there leaving the supplies and baggage, push on to Palpa, where grain, &c. would be found more than sufficient for the whole detachment, and from whence Nyacote might be attacked on its north side, where the well that supplied the garrison was situated; but in the first place he recommended that the redoubt at Jutgurh, cross the foot of the hill of Mujcote, and one mile west of Bootwul, should be reconnoitered and carried, and the deserted town of Bootwul laid in ashes. He placed the success of this affair beyond doubt; and said, that the terror inspired by the first impression of our arms would have a most beneficial effect on our subsequent operations.

The whole plan appeared so reasonable, and he answering for its success, and offering to assist in the execution with such confidence and enthusiasm, that I resolved to begin by reconnoitring and attacking Jutgurh next morning. Major Comyn, with the greater part of the detachment formerly placed under his command, was directed to advance between Jutgurh and Bootwul, so as to turn the left of the position, while the main body should attack it on front and on the right flank: his force consisted of seven companies, that with me of twenty-one; and we marched from camp as soon as the dispersion of the fog would admit of it. I am grieved to say, that instead of debouching from the wood upon an open plain, in front of the work, as we had been led to expect, I arrived with my Staff and the foremost of the advanced guard within fifty paces of it, before it was discovered; a very heavy and galling fire then opened from the redoubt, which was returned by the few men who accompanied my Staff and myself to reconnoitre, until the head of the column and the guns arrived. His Majesty's 17th foot, who led the column, headed by their gallant commander, Colonel Hardyman, supported by the grenadiers of the 2d battalion 17th, and the 14th regiment native infantry, advanced upon the works, while the grenadier and one battalion company of His Majesty's 17th, succeeded in gaining the hill on the right of the redoubt. This party was led by a brave and cool officer, Captain Croker, who drove the enemy before them up the hill, killing a Chief Sooraj Tappah; still the fire from the enemy, concealed by the trees, was kept up with great obstinacy, and the hill, which rose immediately behind the work, was filled with troops; rendering the post, if it had been carried, wholly untenable; I therefore determined to stop the fruitless waste of lives, by sounding retreat.

The conduct of the whole of the troops engaged merits my entire approbation, as expressed in the Order, a copy of which is inclosed. That Order is too concise to do justice to my sense of the merits of individual officers.

For the friendly and judicious advice afforded by Colonel Hardyman, second in command, I shall ever feel much indebted; and I owe my best acknowledgements for the zealous conduct and active assistance afforded me by the Staff, who were all with me.

Nothing could exceed the ardour evinced upon every occasion by Lieutenant Morrison, Field

Engineer, and the deprivation of the aid afforded by his professional talents and excellent judgment, enhances the severe loss I have suffered from his dangerous wound.

The severe wound which Captain M^rDowell received in the early part of the action, deprived us of the services of a most gallant and zealous Officer.

Lieutenants Points and Pickerin were with the foremost parties, and fell, when nobly pressing through the enemy's fire near the redoubt; the first dangerously, and the other severely wounded.

I cannot express how greatly I admired the animated conduct of my Brigade-Major Captain Hiott, in cheering the men to the attack after being dangerously wounded, nor how deeply I feel the loss (which I pray may be temporary) of his services, both as a friend, in whose able counsel I have long had reason to confide, and as an Officer who is an ornament to his profession.

A subsequent report states the loss of the enemy in killed and wounded to have been two hundred, among whom were one of their principal Sirdars and four others of inferior rank.

Some confusion occurred in consequence of the majority of the bearers having thrown down their loads, but the soldiers, both European and native, brought away most of the boxes of ammunition.

Konckanaddee Sewaree, who misled the detachment, was a man who was particularly recommended by Dr. Buchanan, and from whose information that gentleman constructed his map of Neapaul. Having pointed out the fort to me, when within fifty yards of it, he suddenly disappeared, and I am still ignorant of his fate; if he is with the enemy, I can have no doubt of his treachery.

I have, &c.

JOHN S. WOOD, Major-Gen.
Camp, Simlar, January 4, 1815.

Copy of Letters and Inclosures from Major-General Bennet Marley, commanding a division of the Field Army, to the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

It is with the deepest concern and regret, I beg to transmit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the inclosed letters, reporting the disastrous results which occurred yesterday morning, by the enemy attacking and carrying our two posts of Persah and Summudpere, after a considerable, but ineffectual resistance on the part of our troops; against the overwhelming numbers and superior means opposed to them.

On receipt of Major Greenstreet's report at noon, I strengthened the post of Barra Gurhee, opposite to the Suktie Pass, under Captain Hay, with two howitzers and a six-pounder (the former called out from the train at Betteah, for the purpose of being attached to the column under Captain Roughsedge, as detailed in my letter of the 12th ult^o), and the latter posted at Barra Gurhee, by Major Bradshaw; at the first formation of these advanced posts, and which I had withdrawn in prosecution of the ulterior arrange-

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ments for our advance, only two days before, and after forwarding orders to Captain Roughsedge, who was on his march towards my camp from the neighbourhood of Janickpere, and to Captain Blackney, posted at Summudpere, the position from whence the Hurrehupere columns was to have marched), directing them all to concentrate at Barra Gurhee, I marched towards Persah, at two P. M. as well to support Major Greenstreet as to cover our depôt and artillery, the whole of which had been directed to advance towards Persah, and where it was my intention to have joined the train and proceeded towards the Beehiake Pass.

It was four o'clock in the afternoon, after coming some miles, that a Sawar arrived from Gerasahun with the inclosed letter from Lieutenant Strettell, giving an account of the fate of Captain Blackney's detachment. I have directed that officer to proceed with the detachment to Betteah, where further orders will await him.

I marched last night nine miles, till my progress was stopped by a considerable nulla, which it was impossible to have crossed in the dark without great confusion and risk. This morning I again marched, and am now encamped on the high road from Betteah to Persah, which completely covers the advance of the battering train, which marched from the former place on the 1st, agreeably to the orders I had sent Major Mason, as soon as his letter, reporting the arrival of the battering train, reached me.

As the enemy appeared to have retired into the forest, I trust Major Mason will be able to join me to-morrow or next day.

I shall do myself the honour of transmitting correct returns of the casualties, on both occasions, as soon as I can collect the reports.

I have, &c.

B. MARLEY, Major-General,
commanding.
Camp, Serrisowah, January 2, 1815.

Reports from Lieutenant Strettell and Major Greenstreet, inclosed in the preceding.

SIR,

IT is with the deepest regret I have to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Marley, that the left wing, 2d battalion 22d regiment native infantry, was this morning attacked, and compelled to retire.

The enemy advanced about five o'clock this morning in three golahs, and immediately opened a very severe and well-directed fire from about twenty pieces of cannon (as well as could be judged). Captain Blackney, and all the Officers of the wing, did their utmost endeavours to bring on our sepoy's to the charge, which failed in every attempt, from the very destructive fire which opposed them. It is with the utmost sorrow I am to mention, that after the action had continued about ten minutes with equal ardour on each side, we were deprived of the directions and assistance of Captain Blackney and Lieutenant Duncan, who, I fear, are both killed, having been severely wounded and disabled. On the fall of these two gallant Officers, the sepoy's became quite dispirited, and began to retire with

some confusion, upon which the enemy advanced upon and destroyed our tents by fire. The village of Summunpore, in which was the commissariat depôt, was burnt in the commencement of the action by the enemy. Finding that the detachment had suffered most severely, added to the great numbers and strength of the enemy, it was judged most prudent to retire, and as the enemy had taken possession of the road to Barra Ghurrie, we directed our course to this place, at which we have just arrived. I am unable to state the exact loss of the detachment, as the stragglers are coming in every moment. It is my intention to march to-morrow morning towards head-quarters of the army, when I shall have the honour to state the particulars more fully to the Major-General. I cannot conclude without paying the tribute so justly due to the merits of the two brave and valuable Officers who fell this morning, and of all the Officers composing the detachment, who left no exertions untried towards the success of the day. It is impossible to judge correctly of the strength of the enemy, but it is supposed to be about two thousand men.

I have, &c.

E. STRETTLELL, Lieutenant, commanding the detachment.

Gorauh Sahun, January 1, 1815.

Captain Watson, A. A. G.

SIR,

I AM sorry to acquaint you, that the post of Persa Ghurrie, commanded by Captain Sibley, was this morning attacked by an overwhelming force of Goorkahs, who, I regret to say, carried their point after one hour's hard fighting, which ended in the repulse of our troops there, the loss of the gun, and every kind of baggage.

At break of day, when I was about to march for that post, we heard a heavy firing in that direction, when I pushed on with all possible speed; but within three miles of the place I met a vast number of wounded, and immediately afterwards some officers, who informed me, that any attempt on my part to recover the fortune of the day must be unavailing, as the enemy's forces was computed at full ten thousand. I am now halted on the eastern bank of the Seresowah, giving protection to the wounded who are coming in; and intend, as soon as possible, to move in the direction of Betteah, unless I shall receive other instruction from you.

I have, &c.

J. GREENSTREET, Major, commanding 2d Battalion 15th Regiment Native Infantry.

SIR,

IN my hurried report of yesterday I omitted to state the particulars of Major Greenstreet having been detached from the camp at Lewtum on the 31st, at three in the morning, for the purpose of reinforcing the post of Persah, with four companies of the 2d battalion 15th native infantry, in consequence of information, that the Nepaulese were in some force, and intended to attack that post, though the letter received by me from Cap-

tain Sibley, dated so late as the 30th, makes no mention of any thing extraordinary. This will account for Major Greenstreet's reports of yesterday forwarded.

I have received reports, dated 2d instant, from Lieutenant Strettell, stating that he had been joined at Gerasahun by two companies of the Chumparun light infantry, under Ensign Watson, who had effected a timely retreat from a post five coss to the right of Barra Gurhee; and that he intended to march to join Captain Hay at that place immediately.

I trust that these detachments will have joined Captain Hay, and that the Ramghur battalion, under Captain Roughsedge, will also have made a junction, which will make them equal to sustain and repulse any attack the Nepaulese may attempt, as they will have five guns, besides the defences of the fort of Barra Gurhee having been made strong.

Lieutenant Strettell reports that he had one hundred and eighty sepoy fit for duty, and forty-one wounded, inclusive of native commissioned and non-commissioned Officers.

I have this morning received reports from Major Mason, announcing his arrival on this side of the Sakrannee River, on the 2d: his arrival here may therefore be reasonably expected in the course of to-morrow or the day following.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **B. MARLEY**, Major-Gen. Commanding.

Camp, Serissowah, January 3, 1815.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachments at Persah and Summunpore, on the 1st January 1815.

Artillery—1 serjeant, 2 gunners, 1 mattsoss, 3 lascars, 3 ordnance drivers, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 1 gunner, 6 mattsosses, 1 tindal, 6 lascars, 2 ordnance drivers, 1 puckallie, 1 bearer, wounded; 2 ordnance drivers missing.

2d Batt. 15th Native Infantry—1 captain, 1 subadar, 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 3 naicks, 2 drummers, 34 sepoy, 1 native doctor, killed; 1 subadar, 5 havildars, 3 naicks, 2 drummers, 49 sepoy, wounded.

2d Batt. 22d Native Infantry—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, killed; 2 subadars, 1 jemadar, 3 havildars, 3 naicks, 42 sepoy, 2 gun lascars, wounded; 5 havildars, 6 naicks, 58 sepoy, 1 gun lascar, missing.

Detachment Chumporum Light Infantry—1 subadar, 2 jemadars, 1 havildar, 3 naicks, 49 sepoy, 1 bheestie, killed; 1 subadar, 4 havildars, 1 naick, 37 sepoy, 1 bheestie, wounded; 1 naick missing.

Gardner's Irregular Horse—2 duffadars, 7 sawars, 32 horses, killed; 1 jemadar, 9 sawars, 1 horse, wounded.

Total—123 killed; 187 wounded; 73 missing.

Names of Officers killed.

2d Batt. 15th Native Infantry—Captain Sibley.
2d Batt. 22d Native Infantry—Captain Blackncy, Lieutenant Duncan.

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