

only to four thousand five hundred. Perhaps your Lordship may be of opinion, that, under these circumstances, I ought to have risked an action, had no other unfavourable objections existed; but when your Lordship is informed, that I had no possibility of retreat, if unsuccessful, that there would have been no hopes of embarkation if followed, and that the army must have been unavoidably lost if beat, I venture to hope that your Lordship will think, however much it is to be regretted, that I have adopted the only means of maintaining, entire, or indeed of saving an army on which so much depends. I feel the greater confidence in this hope, on reverting to the 13th paragraph of your Lordship's general instructions for the conduct of the campaign.

I am fully aware that there are many circumstances which may require further information, and upon all parts I shall be happy to give every explanation in my power. Your Lordship perhaps may be of opinion, that the place should have been taken; but as it was far too strong to storm, I believe it not only to have been impossible, but that we should not have taken it in eight or ten days: my only regret is, that I continued the siege so long, induced by the hopes of the reinforcements I expected. I continued it to the last moment, and fortunately the weather proving favourable, the troops were embarked without molestation. On this favourable circumstance I

could not depend for another day, and therefore, having taken my part, I immediately put it in execution, and I regret to say, that I was, in consequence, obliged to leave the guns in the most advanced batteries. Had I remained another day, they might have been brought off, but this risk I would not run, when the existence of the army was at stake, not only from unfavourable weather, but from the appearance of an enemy, in whose presence I could not have embarked perhaps at all, certainly not without suffering a great loss, and without the possibility of deriving any advantage.

I have only further at this time to add, should blame be attached to the failure of the expedition, no share of it can fall on Admiral Hallowell, who conducted the naval branch of it. From that distinguished officer I have met with every assistance and co-operation in his power; and I think it only justice to him to state, that it was his opinion that the cannon in the batteries might have been saved by remaining till the night, and that they then could have been brought off. This, however, was a risk I did not wish to run for so trifling an object, and preferred losing them to the chance of the embarkation being opposed, and of an eventual much more serious loss.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. MURRAY, Lt.-Gen.

To the Marquess of Wellington, K. G.

&c. &c. &c.

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