

*Brass Guns and Howitzers.*

- 1 serviceable Six-Inch Howitzer, the Carriage un-serviceable.
- 1 serviceable Four-Pounder Gun, the Carriage un-serviceable.

*Brass and Iron Mortars.*

- 1 serviceable English Eight-Inch.
- 1 serviceable French Eight and Half-Inch, dis-mounted.
- 1 repairable Twelve-Inch.

*Shells.*

- 55 serviceable Thirteen-Inch.
- 40 serviceable Eight-Inch.
- 120 serviceable Seven and Half-Inch.
- 178 serviceable Five and Half-Inch.

*Shot.*

- 755 serviceable Twelve-Pounders.
- 90 serviceable Six-Pounders.
- 40 serviceable Four-Pounders.
- 40 serviceable Three-Pounders.
- 57 serviceable Barrels of Powder.
- 711 serviceable Muskets.
- 40 serviceable Pistols.
- 100 serviceable Files.

About Six Casks of serviceable Musket Ball Cartridges.

- 5 Kegs of serviceable Musket Balls.

*Fort Morelle.**Iron Guns.*

- 2 serviceable Twenty-four-Pounders.
- 1 serviceable Four-Pounder.
- 1 serviceable Three-Pounder.
- 1 serviceable Ten-Inch Iron Mortar.
- 40 serviceable Shells for ditto.
- Shot—22 serviceable Twenty-four-Pounders.
- 15 Barrels of serviceable Powder.

*Point Suere Battery.*

- 2 serviceable Iron Eight-Pounders, mounted.

*Fort Islet.**Iron Guns.*

- 5 serviceable Twenty-four-Pounders.
- 1 serviceable Twelve-Pounder.
- 1 serviceable 1 un-serviceable Six-Pounder.
- 1 serviceable Three-Pounder.

*Brass Mortars, the Beds repairable.*

- 1 serviceable Eight-Inch.
- 1 serviceable Seven and Half-Inch.
- 80 Barrels of serviceable Powder.
- 16,000 serviceable Musket Ball Cartridges.

*Saints' Town Magazine.*

- 12 Barrels of serviceable Powder.

(Signed) EDWARD STEHELIN,  
Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery.

*Downing-Street, June 2, 1809.*

A DISPATCH, of which the following is a Copy, was this Day received by Lord Viscount Castlereagh, One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, from Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

My Lord, *Monte Alegre, May 18, 1809.*

WHEN I determined upon the Expedition to the North of Portugal, against Marshall Soult, I was in hopes that the Portuguese General

Silveira, would be able to hold his Post upon the Tamaga, till he should be reinforced; by which, and by the Possession of Chaves, the Enemy's Retreat would have been cut off, excepting across the Minho; and I intended, if successful, to press him so hard, that the Passage of that River would have been impracticable.

The Loss of the Bridge of Amaranthe, however, on the 2d instant, altered our Prospects: I had no hopes that Marshall Beresford, who marched towards the Upper Part of the Douro on the Fifth, and arrived at Lamego on the Tenth, would be able to effect more than confine the Enemy on that Side, and oblige him to retire by Chaves into Galicia, rather than by Villa Real into Castile.

General Beresford, however, having obliged the Enemy's Posts at Villa Real, and Maisan Frio to fall back with some Loss, and having crossed the Douro, drove in General Loisons Out-Posts at the Bridge of Amaranthe; and again acquired Possession of the left Bank of the Tamaga on the Twelfth, the Day on which the Corps under my Command forced the Passage of the Douro at Oporto.

Loison retired from Amaranthe on the Morning of the 13th, as soon as he had heard of the Events at Oporto of the preceding Day, and met the advanced Guard of the French Army at a short Distance from the Town, which General Beresford immediately occupied.

I was unable to commence the Pursuit of the Enemy till the Morning of the 13th, when the Hanoverian Legion moved to Valonga, under Major-General Murray. On that Evening, I was informed that the Enemy had in the Morning destroyed a great Proportion of his Cannon in the Neighbourhood of Penafiel, and had directed his March towards Braga.

This appeared to be the probable Result of the Situation in which he found himself, in consequence of General Beresford's Operations upon the Tamaga; and as soon as I had ascertained that the Fact was true, I marched on the Morning of the 14th with the Army in two Columns towards the River Minho.

At the same Time I directed General Beresford upon Chaves, in case the Enemy should turn to his Right; and Major-General Murray to communicate with General Beresford, if he should find, as reported, that Loison remained in the Neighbourhood of Amaranthe.

On the Evening of the 14th, I was certain from the Movements of the Enemy's Detachments in the Neighbourhood of Braga, that he intended to direct his Retreat upon Chaves on Monte Alegre; and directed General Beresford, in case of the latter Movement, to push on for Monterey, so as to stop the Enemy, if he should pass by Villa de Rey.

General Beresford had anticipated my Orders to march his own Corps upon Chaves, and had already sent General Silveira to occupy the Passes of Rivaes and Melgasley near Salamonde, but he was unfortunately too late.

I arrived at Braga on the 15th, (General Murray being at Guimaraens, and the Enemy about Fifteen Miles in our Front) and at Salamonde on the Sixteenth.

We had there an Affair with their Rear Guard. The Guards under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke,