fore I should find it necessary to approach near to the ultimate Object of the Movement.

It foon appeared that only a small Number of the Enemy's irregular Horse had been appointed to attend to that Road; but by an extraordinary Activity on their Part, and a most unaccountable Supineness and Want of Exertion on the Part of the Nizam's Cavalry, which neither my Requisitions nor Orders could overcome, we suffered some Loss, both in Baggage and Followers, on the March; and not only the Villages were laid in Ashes, but all the Inhabitants of the Country, on the whole of the Road to Seringapatam, were also, with the most unrelenting Barbarity, carried off, and more completely removed beyond our Reach than could have been supposed to be practicable. Those severe Measures of the Enemy, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a Distance, frequently occasioned a Scarcity in the Camp, both of Forage for the Cattle and Provisions for the Followers; and in a Country, of which no minute or correct Description has hitherto been published, or, 'till now, obtained by any European, I experienced the greatest Inconveniencies, in many Shapes, by the Removal of the Inhabitants.

The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greatest Part of last May; and as none of the People, who pretended to be acquainted with it's Course, and who were repeatedly examined upon that Point, had ever flarted a Doubt of it's being passable for an Army, with heavy Artillery, below Seringapatam, I was not a little surprized and difappointed at finding, from my own personal Inspeczion, or from the Reports of intelligent Officers, who were sent with Detachments in Search of Fords at different Places, that, from it's Bed being rocky, and difficult beyond what I have ever feen for fo great a Tract in any other River, it appeared nearly, if not utterly, impracticable to pais our heaviest Guns over at any Ford that could be discovered be-

low Seringapatam.

After several Disappointments at other Places, I was, for a short Time, encouraged to hope that a Ford might, by confiderable Labour, be rendered practicable near the large Village of Arrakerry, which lay upon our Road, and about Nine or Ten Miles distant from the Capital; and if it could have been accomplished, my Intention was to have possessed my felf of the new Fort of Mysore, which is only distant about Twelve or Fourteen Miles from that Part of the River, and was described to me to be in so unfinished a State as to be incapable of making a considerable Resistance against our Army, though sufficiently advanced to be easily rendered, with a Garrison of our's, a safe Depôt, for a sew Days, for our Stores and heavy Artillery, and to make Two or Three Marches with the Army, lightly equipped, towards Periapatam, in order to put myself between Tippoo and General Abercromby, and Means render our Junction easy and secure. by that

The Army arrived at Arrakerry on the 13th, and a particular Examination of that Ford, as well as of the River for a confiderable Distance above and below it, obliged me, early in the Forenoon of the 14th, to relinquish all Idea of being able to execute that Plan; and, after minutely re-examining every Person in the Army who was acquainted with the River, my Expectations of being able to form an early Junction with General Abcercromby rested folely on Assurances, that the Ford near the Village of Kannambady, about Eight or Nine Miles above Seringapatam, over which it was positively afferted that Hyder Ally had frequently passed Twelve-

Pounders, and fometimes heavier Guns, would be found practicable.

In the mean Time, however, I conceived that Tippoo had furnished an Opening which would enable me to force him to risk an Action, and I refolved not to let flip fo favorable an Opportunity to endeavour to obtain the Reputation to our Arms, which must necessarily result from a Victory in the Sight of his Capital, and, in the Event of my being able to cut off the greatest Part of his Army, to be prepared to follow up the Advantage to the greatest Extent that might be possible.

Upon my Arrival on the Ground, which was

marked for the Encampment at Arrakerry, I faw a confiderable Body of the Enemy, at the Distance of about Six Miles, in our Front, who were drawn up with their Right to the River, and their Left to a Mountain of a very rugged and inaccessible Appearance; but I considered them in no other Light, at that Time, than as a large Detachment, sent to obferve our Motions, without any Defign to wait for

our Approach.

My Intention to pass the River at that Flace, if the Ford could be rendered practicable, and the Hopes that were at first held out of the Success of our working Parties, occasioned my halting on the 14th in the Camp at Arrakerry; and I then obtained certain Intelligence, that although only a small Part of the Enemy's Force could be feen from the Ground in our Possession, yet that Tippoo, with his whole Army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his Right covered by the Caveri, and his Left extended along the Front of a high Mountain, with a deep swampy Ravine, the Passage of which was defended by Batteries running along the whole of his Front; and that being encouraged by the Advantages of this Position, as well as those of the intermediate Ground, which, by the River on one Side and a steep Ridge of Hills on the other, was narrowed to a Space no where between the Two Encampments exceeding a Mile and a Half, and within Cannon Shot of his Line not above One Mile in Breadth, he had determined, at the Hazard of the Event of a Battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer Approach to his

In confequence of this Information, and from my having ascertained, from the few People in Camp who had any Knowledge of the adjoining Country, as well as from the Observations of intelligent Persons who were employed for the Purpole, that it was practicable, though difficult, to cross the Ridge on our Right, from the great Road on which we were encamped to a Road which leads from Cenepatam to Seringapatam, I refolved, upon that Knowledge, to attempt, by a Night March, to turn the Enemy's Left Flank, and, by gaining his Rear before Day-Light, to cut off the Retreat of the Main Body of his Army

to the Island and Fort of Seringapatam.

Orders were accordingly given, with the utmost Secrefy, to the principal Officers who were to be employed, that the 19th Dragoons, the Three strongest of the Native Regiments of Cavalry, His Majesty's Six Regiments, and Twelve Battalions of Native Infantry, with Field Pieces only, should be in Readiness to march at Eleven o'Clock at Night, leaving their Piquets and Camp Guards behind, and their Tents standing; and Colonel Duff, with those Detachments and the Remainder of the Army (except the Nizam's Horse, who were directed to follow me at Day-Light) was left in Charge of the Encampment, Provisions, Stores, and heavy Artillery.

We had suffered greatly, during the preceding Week, by Rains uncommonly frequent and heavy so