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Whitehall, February 1.

THE following Letters from Earl Cornwallis were Yesterday received by the Swallow Packet:

Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 8, 1791.

MY LORD,

I Have by this Opportunity addressed Letters to the Honorable Court of Directors of the East India Company, and to the Secret Committee, containing a general Account of the Operations of the Forces under my Command, since the Month of April last; of the reduced State of Tippoo Sultan's Power and Resources; and of the Plan which has been concerted with our Allies for a vigorous Prosecution of the War, until that Prince shall be disposed to make satisfactory Concessions to the Members of the Confederacy for the Insults and Injuries they have sustained from him.

It is unnecessary to trouble you with a Repetition of the Contents of those Letters, as Copies of them will be transmitted to you officially from the India House; and your Lordship will, by that Means, be enabled to communicate full Information to His Majesty of the Situation of Public Affairs in this Country.

The Duties of all the Troops upon this Service have been singularly severe and arduous; and I request that you will inform the King, that the Patience under Fatigue and Difficulties of various Kinds, and the Intrepidity in Danger, which has been uniformly manifested by the Officers and Soldiers of His Majesty's Regiments, in common with the rest of the Army, has not only merited my warmest Approbation, but will ever do Honor to themselves and to their Country; and the Zeal and Ability with which I have been seconded by Generals Medows and Abercromby, in their respective Situations, has been no less gratifying to myself personally, than useful in promoting the Public Interests.

Inclosed is a Return of the Loss of His Majesty's Troops in Killed and Wounded during the last Campaign.

I have the Honor to be,

My Lord,

Your most obedient and most humble Servant,

CORNWALLIS.

Right Honorable Lord Grenville, One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State; &c. &c. &c.

Return of the Killed and Wounded of His Majesty's Troops during the Siege of Bangalore, from the 5th to the 22d of March, and at the Battle of Seringapatam, on the 15th of May, 1791.

Siege of Bangalore, from the 5th to the 22d of March, 1791.

19th Light Dragoons. 1 Lieutenant-Colonel wounded; 1 Drummer, 2 Rank and File, killed; 7 Rank and File missing.

36th Regiment of Foot. 1 Captain, 9 Rank and File, killed; 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 39 Rank and File, wounded.

52d Ditto. 1 Captain, 4 Rank and File, killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 Drummer, 2 Rank and File, wounded.

71st Ditto. 6 Rank and File killed; 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 12 Rank and File, wounded.

72d Ditto. 6 Rank and File killed; 1 Serjeant, 23 Rank and File, wounded.

74th Ditto. 1 Rank and File killed; 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 7 Rank and File, wounded.

76th Ditto. 6 Rank and File killed; 1 Captain, 2 Serjeants, 2 Drummers, 41 Rank and File, wounded.

Battle of Seringapatam, May 15, 1791.

19th Dragoons. 1 Ensign, 2 Rank and File, killed; 2 Ensigns, 6 Rank and File, wounded.

36th Foot. 2 Rank and File killed; 1 Lieutenant, 6 Rank and File, wounded.

52d Ditto. 1 Lieutenant, 2 Rank and File, killed; 20 Rank and File wounded.

[Price Eight-pence.]



71st Ditto. 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 7 Rank and File, killed; 21 Rank and File wounded.
 72^d Ditto. 1 Lieutenant, 9 Rank and File, wounded.
 74th Ditto. 5 Rank and File killed; 1 Drummer, 8 Rank and File, wounded.
 76th Ditto. 1 Lieutenant, 2 Rank and File, killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 17 Rank and File, wounded.
Total. 2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 54 Rank and File, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 3 Ensigns, 6 Serjeants, 6 Drummers, 211 Rank and File, wounded; 7 Rank and File missing.

Names of Officers killed and wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd wounded March 6, 1791.
 Captain Delany killed. Captain Hart, Lieutenants Eyre, Purefoy and St. John wounded, March 7.
 Captain Terrott killed, March 16; Lieutenant Evans wounded, March 21.
 Captain Wood and Lieutenant John Campbell, jun. wounded, March 21.
 Captain Markham wounded, March 21; Volunteer Llewellyn ditto, included in the Rank and File, March 21.
 Cornet Patterson killed, Cornets Fortnam and Mackenzie wounded.
 Lieutenant Firman wounded.
 Lieutenant and Adjutant Leonard killed.
 Lieutenant and Adjutant M'Kenzie killed; Ensign John Stuart wounded.
 Lieutenant Whitlie wounded.
 Lieutenant Brooke killed, and Lieutenant Griffiths wounded.

N. B. The Siege of Bangalore includes the following Actions:

March 5. Tippoo's Attack in the Rear of the Army, on approaching Bangalore.

March 6. Colonel Floyd's Skirmish with the Rear of Tippoo's Army.

March 7. Storm of the Pettah or Suburbs of Bangalore: Tippoo's Attack on our Camp, and Attempt to recover the Pettah.

March 17. Tippoo's Attack on our Camp; and, on the 21st, his Attempt to counteract our Approaches, and enfilade our Batteries. Assault of the Fort that Night.

To the Honorable Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honorable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

HONORABLE SIRS,

I Had the Honor, in my Letter dated at Venkatagerry on the 20th of April last, to give your Honorable Court an Account of the principal Operations of the Army under my Command prior to that Period, and to communicate my Intention to attack Seringapatam, if it should be found practicable, with a View to leave no Means untried to bring this War to a speedy Termination; and although the Multiplicity of Objects which perpetually break in upon my Time, and press for immediate Attention in my present Situation, will not permit me to enter into many Details; I shall now proceed to explain to you the Manner in which the premature Setting-in of the Monsoon Rains, the Difficulty of passing the Caveri River, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, operated as irresistible Reasons to force me to desist, at that Time, from undertaking the Siege of the Enemy's Capital, and to acquaint you with the Occurrences that have materially contributed to reduce Tippoo's Strength and Re-

sources, and to give a very favorable Prospect of Success to the Plan of Operations, which has been adopted by all the Members of the Confederacy, for the ensuing Campaign.

Previous to the Commencement of my March to Seringapatam, Tippoo, in Addition to the Mortification which he suffered from the Loss of Bangalore, had also felt the Consequences of that Blow at a great Distance, and our Allies had, from it's Effects, gained very decisive Advantages.

The strong Fortresses of Durwar and Copaul had long been invested and besieged by the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and with so little Prospect of Success, that it had been more than once under the Consideration of the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad whether they should not convert those Sieges into Blockades, to set their Armies at Liberty for more active Operations; but the News of the Fall of Bangalore, which seemed to have been unexpected by the Garrisons of those Places, so effectually intimidated them, that although in no Shape reduced to Extremity, or even Distress, they agreed to surrender.

Large Magazines of Military Stores, which had been amassed in those Places, at a vast Expence, by Tippoo, fell into the Hands of the Captors; and during the Time that I was employed in forming a Junction with the Nizam's Cavalry, and in drawing Supplies and Reinforcements from the Carnatic, they also obtained complete Possession of the whole of the Enemy's extensive and valuable Territories lying between the Khristna and Tumbuddra.

Nothing of Consequence occurred on the March from Venkatagerry to Bangalore, and after having taken out of that Place heavy Guns and Supplies of Military Stores and Provisions, to the utmost Extent that could be transported by the general zealous Assistance that I received from the Officers of the Army, and by all the Draft and Carriage Cattle in the Possession of the Public; and after having received Information that General Abercromby, with a Battering Train, which, in Addition to my own, I was in Hopes would be sufficient for the Accomplishment of our Object, was at the Head of the Pondicherrum Ghaur, and in Readiness to co-operate with me, I moved on the 3^d of May from the Neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a respectable and sufficient Corps of Artillery, the Nizam's Horse, His Majesty's 19th Regiment of Dragoons, Five Regiments of Native Cavalry, Six King's Regiments, and One of the Company's European Regiments, and Seventeen Battalions of Native Infantry.

Tippoo, after calling in all his Detachments, had, about that Time, encamped near Magri, and soon after, receiving Information of my Movement, he marched, by one of the most direct Roads, to his Capital, where he arrived on the 8th or 9th of May.

I knew that he had long before given Orders to burn the Villages, and to destroy the Provisions and Forage on all the Roads by which we could march to Seringapatam, and therefore no Road was, in these Respects, preferable to another; but, after the most mature Consideration, I determined to take the most Easterly Route, which passes through Cankanelly, though it is not the shortest, because it would lead us near the Banks of the Caveri for many Miles before we should reach Seringapatam; and as there is no Place of Strength near the Capital on the North Side of the River, in which I could lodge the heavy Artillery and Stores in Security for a few Days, with a moderate Garrison, I was in Hopes that I might be able to cross that River with the whole of the Army, and to effect a Junction with General Abercromby, before

fore I should find it necessary to approach near to the ultimate Object of the Movement.

It soon appeared that only a small Number of the Enemy's irregular Horse had been appointed to attend to that Road; but by an extraordinary Activity on their Part, and a most unaccountable Supineness and Want of Exertion on the Part of the Nizam's Cavalry, which neither my Requisitions nor Orders could overcome, we suffered some Loss, both in Baggage and Followers, on the March; and not only the Villages were laid in Ashes, but all the Inhabitants of the Country, on the whole of the Road to Seringapatam, were also, with the most unrelenting Barbarity, carried off, and more completely removed beyond our Reach than could have been supposed to be practicable. Those severe Measures of the Enemy, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a Distance, frequently occasioned a Scarcity in the Camp, both of Forage for the Cattle and Provisions for the Followers; and in a Country, of which no minute or correct Description has hitherto been published, or, 'till now, obtained by any European, I experienced the greatest Inconveniencies, in many Shapes, by the Removal of the Inhabitants.

The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greatest Part of last May; and as none of the People, who pretended to be acquainted with it's Course, and who were repeatedly examined upon that Point, had ever started a Doubt of it's being passable for an Army, with heavy Artillery, below Seringapatam, I was not a little surprized and disappointed at finding, from my own personal Inspection, or from the Reports of intelligent Officers, who were sent with Detachments in Search of Fords at different Places, that, from it's Bed being rocky, and difficult beyond what I have ever seen for so great a Tract in any other River, it appeared nearly, if not utterly, impracticable to pass our heaviest Guns over at any Ford that could be discovered below Seringapatam.

After several Disappointments at other Places, I was, for a short Time, encouraged to hope that a Ford might, by considerable Labour, be rendered practicable near the large Village of Arrakerry, which lay upon our Road, and about Nine or Ten Miles distant from the Capital; and if it could have been accomplished, my Intention was to have possessed myself of the new Fort of Myfore, which is only distant about Twelve or Fourteen Miles from that Part of the River, and was described to me to be in so unfinished a State as to be incapable of making a considerable Resistance against our Army, though sufficiently advanced to be easily rendered, with a Garrison of our's, a safe Depôt, for a few Days, for our Stores and heavy Artillery, and to make Two or Three Marches with the Army, lightly equipped, towards Periapatam, in order to put myself between Tippoo and General Abercromby, and by that Means render our Junction easy and secure.

The Army arrived at Arrakerry on the 13th, and a particular Examination of that Ford, as well as of the River for a considerable Distance above and below it, obliged me, early in the Forenoon of the 14th, to relinquish all Idea of being able to execute that Plan; and, after minutely re-examining every Person in the Army who was acquainted with the River, my Expectations of being able to form an early Junction with General Abercromby rested solely on Assurances, that the Ford near the Village of Kannambady, about Eight or Nine Miles above Seringapatam, over which it was positively asserted that Hyder Ally had frequently passed Twelve-

Pounders, and sometimes heavier Guns, would be found practicable.

In the mean Time, however, I conceived that Tippoo had furnished an Opening which would enable me to force him to risk an Action, and I resolved not to let slip so favorable an Opportunity to endeavour to obtain the Reputation to our Arms, which must necessarily result from a Victory in the Sight of his Capital, and, in the Event of my being able to cut off the greatest Part of his Army, to be prepared to follow up the Advantage to the greatest Extent that might be possible.

Upon my Arrival on the Ground, which was marked for the Encampment at Arrakerry, I saw a considerable Body of the Enemy, at the Distance of about Six Miles, in our Front, who were drawn up with their Right to the River, and their Left to a Mountain of a very rugged and inaccessible Appearance; but I considered them in no other Light, at that Time, than as a large Detachment, sent to observe our Motions, without any Design to wait for our Approach.

My Intention to pass the River at that Place, if the Ford could be rendered practicable, and the Hopes that were at first held out of the Success of our working Parties, occasioned my halting on the 14th in the Camp at Arrakerry; and I then obtained certain Intelligence, that although only a small Part of the Enemy's Force could be seen from the Ground in our Possession, yet that Tippoo, with his whole Army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his Right covered by the Caveri, and his Left extended along the Front of a high Mountain, with a deep swampy Ravine, the Passage of which was defended by Batteries running along the whole of his Front; and that being encouraged by the Advantages of this Position, as well as those of the intermediate Ground, which, by the River on one Side and a steep Ridge of Hills on the other, was narrowed to a Space no where between the Two Encampments exceeding a Mile and a Half, and within Cannon Shot of his Line not above One Mile in Breadth, he had determined, at the Hazard of the Event of a Battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer Approach to his Capital.

In consequence of this Information, and from my having ascertained, from the few People in Camp who had any Knowledge of the adjoining Country, as well as from the Observations of intelligent Persons who were employed for the Purpose, that it was practicable, though difficult, to cross the Ridge on our Right, from the great Road on which we were encamped to a Road which leads from Cenepatam to Seringapatam, I resolved, upon that Knowledge, to attempt, by a Night March, to turn the Enemy's Left Flank, and, by gaining his Rear before Day-Light, to cut off the Retreat of the Main Body of his Army to the Island and Fort of Seringapatam.

Orders were accordingly given, with the utmost Secrecy, to the principal Officers who were to be employed, that the 19th Dragoons, the Three strongest of the Native Regiments of Cavalry, His Majesty's Six Regiments, and Twelve Battalions of Native Infantry, with Field Pieces only, should be in Readiness to march at Eleven o'Clock at Night, leaving their Piquets and Camp Guards behind, and their Tents standing; and Colonel Duff, with those Detachments and the Remainder of the Army (except the Nizam's Horse, who were directed to follow me at Day-Light) was left in Charge of the Encampment, Provisions, Stores, and heavy Artillery.

We had suffered greatly, during the preceding Week, by Rains uncommonly frequent and heavy so early

early in the Season: But unluckily, on that particular Night, we had for several Hours the most violent Thunder, Lightning and Rain that I have seen in this Part of India.

The Ground of our Encampment having been intersected by some ruined Villages and Inclosures, and several deep Ravines, much valuable Time was lost before it was possible to form the Troops in the Order of March which was directed; and, owing to the heavy Rain and excessive Darkness of the Night, I was obliged to halt so frequently after I had begun to move forward, either on Account of many of the Regiments losing at different Times the Line of March, or of the Weakness of the Gun Bullocks, which were jaded and exhausted by the Severity of the Storm, that I had only advanced a few Miles when the Day began to dawn.

All Hopes were then at an End of being able to execute my original Plan; but having accomplished the Part of the March that had been described to me as the most difficult, and having the utmost Confidence in the Valour and Discipline of the King's and Company's Troops, I determined to persevere in endeavouring to force Tippoo to hazard an Action on Ground which I hoped would be less advantageous to him than that which he had chosen, with the Expectation that a complete Victory might not only relieve many of our temporary Distresses, but tend to bring the War to a very speedy Conclusion.

The Army, therefore, continued its March; and the Movement had been so entirely unexpected by the Enemy, that we had begun to descend the Heights on the Eastward of the deep Ravine that I have mentioned, and at the Distance of Four or Five Miles from the Left of their Camp, before they took the Alarm.

After some Movements, the Object of which could not for a short Time be clearly ascertained, it appeared that Tippoo, notwithstanding that we were advancing by a Route for which he was not prepared, did not decline to risk the Event of a Battle in a new Position: He detached immediately from his Main Body a large Corps of Infantry and Cavalry, with Eight Guns, to occupy the Summit of a rising Ground, about Two Miles from the Extremity of his Left, which terminates to the Northward in an abrupt Precipice in the middle of a Plain; and though the Ascent is broken by large Rocks, and some intermediate lesser Heights, rises gradually for about a Mile and a Half, or Two Miles, from a Valley that was in our Front, and which continued to the Caveri, and divided the Ridge of Hills that we had crossed during the Night from another steep Ridge, consisting principally of Two large Mountains (on a projecting Point of the Southernmost of which stands the Carigut Pagoda) running nearly at right Angles to the former, at the Distance of about a Mile and a Half, and extending very near to the Caveri, opposite the Island of Seringapatam.

Whilst the Corps was on its March, to possess itself of the Summit that I have mentioned, Tippoo was employed in changing the Front of his Army to the Left, covering his Left Flank with the steep Hill, which had been in his Rear, and his Right Flank with the Ravine, which ran along his former Front.

The Disposition on our Side for Action could only be made on the Ascent of the Heights, to the Summit of which the Enemy's Detachment was then moving, and from which it was absolutely necessary to dislodge it before I could attack their Main Body.

Our March was therefore continued in that Direction across the Valley through which ran a Continuation of the Ravine which covered the Enemy's Right; but, owing to the Depth of that Ravine, the

weak State of the Gun Bullocks, and the near Approach of a large Body of the Enemy's Horse, that, though repulsed in several Attempts, appeared to be prepared to take Advantage of the least Disorder in any of our Battalions, it was upwards of Two Hours after the Passage of the Head of the Column before the whole Infantry could cross to the same Side of the Ravine with the Enemy, and consequently before the Disposition for Action could be completed; and during that Time we suffered some Loss from the Guns on the Height, opposite to the Head of the Column, but were severely galled by a well-directed though distant Fire from the Artillery of the Enemy's Main Body, which had formed nearly parallel to the Direction of our March.

Under these Difficulties, and under the Disadvantage of the Want of all satisfactory local Information beyond what could be seen, of the intended Field of Battle, and of the adjoining Country, Nine Battalions were formed opposite to the Enemy's Main Body, in a first Line, under the Command of Major-General Medows and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart; Four Battalions in a Second Line, under Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, and Five under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, were destined for the Attack of the Enemy's Corps on the Summit of the Hill upon our Right. This Attack had been unavoidably postponed until the other Parts of the Disposition could be made, and by that Means Tippoo should be effectually awed and prevented from making any Attempt on the Flank or Rear of those Troops whilst they were moving forward to drive his Detachment from their Post. Our own Cavalry and the Nizam's Horse were left out of the Reach of the Cannonade on the Descent of the rising Ground on the opposite Side of the Ravine, in Readiness to take Advantage of any Confusion they might observe in the Enemy's Army; and Orders were given to Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, after succeeding in his Attack, to leave only a sufficient Force to retain Possession of the Summit of the Hill, and to advance immediately with the Remainder of his Corps, and endeavour to possess himself of the Mountains which covered the Left Flank of the Main Army of the Enemy.

A rocky Height afforded considerable Protection to the Troops from the Enfilade from the Hill on our Right, during the Time that was necessarily employed in making the Disposition and forming the Lines; which being accomplished, I began the Action by ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell's Corps to attack the Hill on our Right, and, upon observing that he had, without much Loss or Difficulty, completely succeeded, I moved forward with the Main Body of the Army, and the Action soon became general along the whole Front.

The Enemy's Cavalry, that had harassed us, and frequently attempted to break in upon the Infantry whilst the Column was passing the Ravine, made no Stand after we were prepared to advance, Part of it retreating to the Westward of the Ridge on which the Carigut Pagoda stands, with the Infantry that had been driven from the Hill by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, and the Remainder falling into the Rear of the Main Army.—Their Infantry, on this Occasion, shewed a much better Countenance than usual, which perhaps may be principally attributed to Tippoo's own Presence and Exertions amongst them; but, in a short Time, they began to waver, and soon after, upon the Cavalry moving towards their Right, and Three Battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell's Corps advancing rapidly to gain the Heights on their Left, they entirely gave Way.

At

At this Moment our own Cavalry made a gallant Charge ; but, after dispersing and almost destroying a small Body of Infantry that made a very determined Resistance, were soon obliged to fall back, from a more considerable Body of Infantry, that had rallied and made a Stand on a Space of broken rocky Ground, extremely disadvantageous for Cavalry ; and at the Moment of their Retreat, and whilst the whole of our first Line was impeded by it, the Nizam's Horse, which had followed Colonel Floyd across the Ravine, with very good Intentions, but very injudiciously, threw themselves, in an unweildy Mass, into the Front of our Left Wing, on a Piece of Ground so rugged and rocky, as well as so near to the Enemy's Batteries on the Island of Seringapatam, that they could not act with Efficacy in Front, and continued to prevent our Line of Infantry from advancing, by which Means an invaluable, though short Space of Time was lost, which enabled the Enemy to avail themselves of the Vicinity of the Batteries upon the Island, and, by retreating to their Protection in the utmost Confusion, to save their Army from entire Destruction.

Fatigued and exhausted as the Troops were by the Badness of the Night, the Tedioufness of the March, and by their long and extraordinary Exertions during an excessive hot Day, and covered, as the beaten Enemy were, by the Works on the Island and by the Guns of the Fort, nothing more could then be attempted ; and the Army accordingly, after the Arrival of the Tents from Arrakerry, encamped just beyond the Reach of the Cannon on the Island, and nearly on the Ground upon which the Action had terminated.

Three of the Enemy's Guns were taken on the Hill that was attacked by the Corps under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell ; and One Gun, with a great Number of Standards and Colours, were taken from their Main Body. Their Loss in Men was very considerable, but the Number could not be ascertained.

It may probably appear to you, and to any other Persons unacquainted with the peculiar Situation of Seringapatam, that, after having defeated the Enemy's Army, I might have proceeded to the Attack of the Place, without losing Time, or putting myself to any material Inconvenience ; to form a Junction with General Abercromby ; but even if I had thought the heavy Guns that I had brought with me sufficient for the Siege, I could not there, as at Bangalore, chuse my Point of Attack, and keep my Army in a compact State to resist the whole Force of the Enemy, and defend my Approaches. In order to besiege the Fort it would have been necessary to force my Passage over to the Island ; and this can only be done on the North Side, opposite to the Carigut Pagoda, where there is a good Ford, at the Distance of more than a Mile from the Fort ; for the Ford on the South Side is not only very rugged and difficult, but is likewise commanded, within 700 Yards, by the Works of Seringapatam, and the Bridge, which is still standing on that Side, is immediately under the Guns of the Place.

The Ground on the South Side rises gradually from the River ; and, as Tippoo would certainly have crossed over with his Army to that Side, as soon as he saw my Batteries in sufficient Forwardness to enable me to force the Passage of the Northern Ford, I should have been exposed, on getting upon the Island, to a cross Fire from the Fort and from the Enemy's Army, which would not only have rendered it impossible for me to attempt the Siege, but would probably have obliged me to abandon the Island with considerable Loss.

It was therefore necessary, before any Attempt could be made upon the Island, that a Force, able to resist the Attack of Tippoo's whole Army, should be stationed on the South Side of the River, which could only be effected by my joining some of my Battalions to the Corps under General Abercromby ; and I therefore determined, after allowing the Troops to recover themselves a little from their Fatigues, by an Halt of Two Days on the Field of Battle, to proceed to the Kanambaddy Ford, according to my former Intention.

The Soil of all the Parts of the Mysore Country, that I have seen, is in general dry, and by Nature unfruitful, and Sustenance, either for Men or Animals, can only be raised upon it by a most persevering Industry in it's Inhabitants ; but the Country adjoining to Seringapatam is peculiarly rugged and barren. The Mountains are immense bare Rocks, and the lower Grounds are so thin in Soil, and so universally and closely covered with large loose Stones, that no considerable Produce can be raised from them by the Exertions of any Degree of Industry whatever.

The utmost Pains had likewise been taken by the Enemy, during the Two preceding Months, to destroy all the Villages, and every Particle of Forage and Provisions belonging to the Inhabitants, within a Circuit of several Miles ; and to those Circumstances, of so much Disadvantage to the Operations of the Army, was to be added the premature Setting-in of the Monsoon, near a Month before the usual Period ; and, by the united Operation of the Causes that I have stated, we had not only, during the Six or Eight preceding Days, suffered very considerable Losses amongst our Draft and Carriage Cattle, but the greatest Part of those which survived, were at this Time reduced to a very weakly Condition.

We were obliged to make so great a Detour, that we could only reach the Kanambaddy Ford in Two Marches ; and as the Face of the Country is exceedingly uneven and hilly, intersected with a Number of deep Ravines, and the Road for the heavy Guns was to be made the whole Way by our own Pioneers, these Marches were found so difficult, that, notwithstanding the Pressure for Time, I was forced to halt One Day, after the first March, by the Draft Cattle having been completely exhausted in accomplishing it.

Considerable Detachments of Troops were ordered to attend and assist the heavy Guns on the second Day's March ; but the Bullocks were so extremely reduced, that, even with the Aid of the Soldiers at the Drag-Ropes, their Progress was so tedious, that the Body of the Army was upwards of Twelve Hours in marching as many Miles, and the Rear Guard did not reach the Encampment near the Ford till Nine o'Clock in the Evening of the 20th of May.

It was not, however, till after I had received the Reports from the different Departments, on the following Morning, of the general wretched Condition of the public Cattle of the Army, that I saw the Impossibility of moving the heavy Guns and Stores from the Spot where they then were, and that it became necessary for me to decide on relinquishing entirely the Prosecution of the Plan for the Campaign, in which General Abercromby had been instructed to co-operate. I then lost no Time in communicating my Determination to General Abercromby, who had advanced as far as Periapattam ; and I directed him, after descending the Ghaut with the Troops under his Command, to put them into Cantonments on the Coast of Malabar, during the Rains, and until the proper Season should return for re-commencing our Operations.



The Effects of several Circumstances, from which we had already suffered many Inconveniencies, pressed upon us particularly hard at this Juncture; and none more than the Conduct of the Nizam's Cavalry, who were now, if possible, more inactive and more inattentive to my Requisitions than ever.

Far from rendering the Services that I had expected from so numerous and powerful a Body of Horse, in-facilitating our Foraging, and in covering extensive Tracts of Country, from which our Followers, as well as themselves, might have obtained considerable Supplies of Provisions, they had, regardless of my Remonstrances, since the Commencement of our March from Bangalore, hardly ever sent a Detachment beyond the Piquets of our Infantry, and had persevered in exhausting the small Stock of Forage and Provisions, which, in Spite of the Devastation made by the Enemy, was generally found within the Bounds of the Encampment, and which, if we had not been encumbered with them, we could have commanded for the Use of our own Army.

By this extraordinary Degree of obstinate Supineness, that large Body of Men, with their Horses and numerous Followers, about this Time, experienced the severest Distresses from Scarcity; and the vast Multitude of People belonging to our Army, for whom it is impossible for the Public to carry a Stock of Provisions, were reduced to nearly the same Situation. Rice became so dear in the Buzars, that either the Pressure of Hunger or the Temptation of the extravagant Prices, proved too powerful against all Precautions that could be taken, and occasioned Depredations of the Grain that had been provided and brought with us, to supply the fighting Men of the Army, to so alarming an Extent, that the Apprehension that there would be a Want of Grain for the Soldiers, long before the Stores that had been provided for them ought to have been expended, operated powerfully, with other Reasons, to force me to fall back to Bangalore.

Urgent, however, as our own Necessities were to move nearer to our Supplies, I could not leave Tippoo at Liberty to employ his whole Force against General Abercromby; and, therefore, resolved to remain in my Position near the Ford, which held the main Body of the Enemy's Army in Check at Seringapatam, until I should have Reason to believe that General Abercromby was out of all Danger of being interrupted in his Retreat by Tippoo's either marching in Person, or considerably reinforcing the Corps which I knew he had detached against him, but which alone was not of sufficient Strength to make me apprehend that it could give General Abercromby any material Molestation.

In the mean Time I gave Directions to burst Eleven heavy Guns, Eight Eighteen and Three Twenty-four Pounders, to bury or destroy the Military Stores that could not be carried with us, and to deliver nearly the whole of the Rice in our Possession to the Troops, which, on a Calculation of easy Marches, would have been sufficient to subsist them until they should arrive at Bangalore; Measures which had now become the more indispensibly necessary, as, in Addition to the Losses of public Cattle that we had suffered from the Causes that I have mentioned, an epidemical Disorder, not uncommon in this Country, had broke out amongst them, and had carried off several Thousands in a few Days.

Having remained long enough to give ample Time to General Abercromby to fall back from Periapatam, I moved from my Encampment near the Ford on the Morning of the 26th, with the Intention to proceed to Bangalore, and to employ a few Months

in refreshing and refitting the Army, and to make every other necessary Preparation for resuming our Operations against the Enemy's Capital, as soon as the Rivers should subside, unless Tippoo, in the mean Time, should agree to make such Concessions as the Confederates might reasonably think they had a Right to exact from him.

Upon reaching the Ground that had been fixed upon for the first Day's Encampment, I was told, to my great Surprise, that some Mahratta Messengers had arrived to inform me that the Two Mahratta Armies, under the Command of Hurry Punt and Perferam Bhow, were at no great Distance from us, and that their advanced Corps under Appa Saheb, Perferam Bhow's Son, was almost in Sight.

I had for some Weeks before given up all Hopes of being joined by the Mahrattas, with whose dilatory Conduct I was much dissatisfied; and although I saw that their Junction at this critical Time would be attended with many Advantages to the common Cause, I could not help lamenting, as not only our heavy Guns were now destroyed, but General Abercromby's Corps had actually descended the Ghauts, that by their Tardiness in commencing their March, and from my having even been deprived of all Knowledge of their Approach by the Vigilance of the Enemy's Light Troops, and the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, an Opportunity was lost which could not now be recalled, to drive the Enemy's whole Army, that had so recently been humbled by a Defeat, and would not have dared to keep the Field, into the Island of Seringapatam; where its Distresses must soon have reduced Tippoo to the Necessity of submitting to the Terms of Peace that we might have prescribed to him.

I took Measures, however, immediately for fixing as early a Day as possible for an Interview with the Chiefs, which, by a Movement of both Armies, took Place Three Days after; and as it was of great Consequence to cultivate a good Understanding with them, I said very little on the just Grounds which I had to complain of the Lateness of their Arrival, and contented myself, at the first Meeting, with obtaining a Knowledge of the Nature of their Instructions, and of their future Intentions.

They made the most explicit Declarations, that they were ordered by the Peshwa, and that it was equally their own Inclination, to act entirely in Concert with me; and in the Course of Two or Three Conferences, it was not only settled that all the Confederate Forces should keep the Field in the Mysore Country during the Rains, but they also acquiesced in a general Arrangement that I proposed for the Disposition of the Armies, the principal Objects of which were, to give me an easy and safe Communication with the Carnatic, to enable me to draw from thence the Supplies of Artillery and Stores that would be necessary for prosecuting the Operations of the ensuing Campaign, to subsist the Allied Armies, as much as might be possible, at the Expence of the Enemy, and to endeavour to deprive him of the Revenues and Resources of all the Northern Parts of his Dominions.

Having stated to the Mahratta Chiefs the Danger of attempting to maintain the Communication with their own Country by the Route to the Westward of Chittledroog, by which Perferam Bhow had marched from Durwar, they agreed to relinquish it, and to be satisfied with that by Sera and Roydroog, which I recommended as preferable, on Condition that I would delay my March to the Eastward until all the Detachments, which Perferam Bhow had left upon his Route, could join the Army, or be sent back across the

the Zumbuddra; to which, upon their Assurances that we should be able to purchase from the Grain Dealers attached to them, a sufficient Quantity of Grain to subsist our Troops and Followers for some Time to come, I consented.

In order, therefore, to effect these Purposes, we halted frequently, and having, soon after the Junction of the Mahrattas, sent back to the Nizam all those of his Troops that had, either from the Loss or the Weakness of their Horses, become unfit for Service, the Confederate Force moved together gradually, though slowly, towards Bangalore; and upon our Arrival within about Twenty Miles of that Place, it was thought advisable to acquiesce in Perferam Bhow's Wishes to move with the Army under his own immediate Command towards Sera, to secure that Communication, and to possess himself of the adjoining Country, according to the Plan that had been arranged, Hurry Punt, with his Division and the Nizam's Cavalry, remaining with our Army.

After drawing from Bangalore Four heavy Guns and a Supply of Provisions, I marched from the Neighbourhood of that Place, on the 15th of July towards Oussore, a Fortrefs upon which Tippoo has bestowed much Labour and Expence, but which, though in a very defensible State, was not completely finished. The Garrison abandoned the Place on the Approach of a Detachment that I had sent forward to invest and summon it; but they at the same Time sprung a Mine under one of the Bastions that did considerable Damage, and attempted, though unsuccessfully, by a Train, to blow up the Powder Magazine.

Conformable to my Plan I placed the heavy Guns and the spare Stores and Provisions in the Fort of Oussore, with a good Garrison, and the Damage occasioned by the Explosion was ordered to be repaired with all possible Expedition: A strong Escort was at the same Time sent to bring a large Convoy of various Kinds of Supplies from Amboor.

On the 18th of July the Army marched to support a Brigade that I had detached to endeavour to reduce the Hill Forts adjoining to the Polycode Pass (by far the easiest and best in the whole Range of Mountains that divide the Mysore Country from the Carnatic) and in a few Days we were fortunate enough, by the spirited Behaviour of our Troops, and the Pusillanimity of the Garrisons, to obtain Possession of a sufficient Number of those small, but exceedingly strong Places, to afford considerable Protection to the March of our Convoys, and to render it hazardous and difficult for the Enemy to send Troops into the Baramaul.

I conceive it to be needless to trouble you with a Detail of the Preparations that will be made in the Course of the next Two Months for insuring Success to the Plan of Operations for the ensuing Campaign, which will be nearly similar to that which was intended for the last; and shall therefore content myself with assuring you, that no Exertions of mine shall be wanting to render them compleat; and that I have an entire Confidence in meeting with the most thorough Support from all your Governments.

It would be vain to suppose that we should remain long undisturbed by an Enemy so able and active as Tippoo: But although, from the immense Extent of our Possessions and Posts, it may be impossible to prevent him from gaining some small Advantages during the Period that we are restrained from carrying on offensive Operations, I trust it will not be in his Power to do any Thing which can either materially injure or impede the Execution of our main Objects.

He has lately, as I had long expected, made an Attempt to disturb the Country of Coimbatore and our Southern Provinces, in which he has been completely foiled by the Gallantry and good Conduct of the Officers in that Quarter. But he has been successful in routing a small Detachment of Irregulars, which Perferam Bhow had left at a great Distance from his Army, to blockade the Hill Fort of Madgaeri, not far from Sera. I cannot say that I was much surprized at this Accident; and indeed, notwithstanding my repeated Recommendations to them, to be cautious in detaching, and to avoid bad and distant Posts, they are so apt to deviate from System in the Execution of any Plan, that I am afraid they must feel the ill Consequences of improvident Conduct still more severely before I shall be able completely to command their Attention.

The Inconveniences which the Expence of this War must occasion to your Finances have given me the most sincere Concern; but, on the other Hand, it is a Source of Satisfaction to myself, as it must be to every other Person who feels for the Interest and Honor of the Company and the Nation, that there is at present a favorable Prospect that it will be terminated with valuable Acquisitions to the Company, and to the other Members of the Confederacy; and with the Humiliation of a Prince, who forced us to draw the Sword by a wanton Violation of a solemn Treaty, and whose overgrown Power, directed by a perfidious and barbarous Disposition, and by a Spirit of insatiable Ambition, has frequently given just Cause of Alarm for the Safety of your Possessions in this Part of India, and has long rendered him an Object of the utmost Terror to all his other Neighbours.

Impelled, however, as I was, by the Consideration of the State of your Finances, to put something to the Hazard, in attempting to bring the War to a speedy Conclusion, the Information that I had received of the Situation of political Affairs in Europe operated also strongly to induce me to make an Effort to reduce the Enemy's Capital, and by that Means entirely break his Power, before the Setting-in of the periodical Rains; and although a Number of Circumstances combined to counteract my Endeavour to shorten in that Manner the Duration of the War, yet whilst the Failure has reflected no Disgrace upon the British Arms, the Attempt has in other Respects produced many solid Advantages to the common Cause, and without having been attended with any material Addition to the Expence, which we must necessarily have incurred if the Army had, during the same Period, remained in a State of Inactivity.

I have Reason to be persuaded that all Instances on my Part would have been ineffectual, and that nothing but an Apprehension that their Interests might suffer by their not being present at the Reduction of Seringapatam, could have prevailed upon both the Mahratta Chiefs to leave in other Hands the Collection of the Revenues in the Enemy's fertile Northern Dominions that they had over-run, and to advance so rapidly to the Southward to form a Junction with me; and it is in consequence of that Junction, and of their having consented to remain with their numerous and powerful Cavalry to act in Concert with us, that we have been able, for so long a Period, to hem Tippoo with his Army into a very circumscribed Space, and to deprive him of all Revenue or Supplies of any Kind from the greatest Part of his extensive Territories.

At the Time that we suffered the greatest Inconvenience from the Inactivity of the Nizam's Cavalry, and I expressed my Dissatisfaction, in the strongest

Terms,

Terms, at the Behaviour of the Chiefs, I was perfectly sensible, that even their Presence contributed to awe the Enemy, and was otherwise of Value, as being a Proof of the strong Connexion of the Confederacy; and I saw no Ground to impute Blame to his Highness on their Account, in any other Shape than that of Want of Judgement in placing at the Head of so large a Portion of his Forces, such a Man as Rajah Teigewunt, who is destitute, to an uncommon Degree, of almost every Quality which a Military Commander ought to possess; and in employing several Chiefs under him, who, from their Rank and superior Military Experience, must naturally become his Advisers, or have great Influence with him; but on whose Honor and Fidelity his Highness should not have placed a Dependence.

I have, from Time to Time, conveyed these Sentiments to the Nizam and his Minister, in the most explicit Terms, and I have every Reason to be satisfied with the Impression that my Representations have made upon them; for, in order to remedy the Defects of which I have complained, and render the Services of his Troops more efficacious in future, he has promised to send his second Son, Secunder Jah, with the Minister, Azeem ul Omrah, to command them; and he has given me the strongest Assurances, through Meer Allum, who lately arrived in Camp; that the Prince and the Minister, with all the intended Reinforcements, in which the Two Company's Battalions in his Pay will be included, shall, conformable to my Desire, join me before the End of the Month of October.

Reduced as Tippoo's Resources now are, and diminished and dispirited as his Army must be by our repeated Successes, there can be little Doubt of his being desirous of Peace; but I have not yet discovered any clear Symptoms of his haughty Mind being prepared to submit to the Terms which the Allies, from a Consideration of their future Safety, and of their Right to expect some Compensation for their Losses and Expences, will think it necessary to impose upon him.

After having been equally unsuccessful, with the Peshwa and the Nizam, as with myself, in frequent Attempts, during the last three or four Months, to create Jealousies among the Confederates, by proposing to open separate Negotiations with them, without admitting his Knowledge of the Nature of the Confederacy, he at last thought proper to comply with my Recommendation to address himself, at the same Time, to the Three Powers, and to request Permission to send a Vackeel to treat with them collectively.

Permission was accordingly granted; but as the Vackeel preferred Claims respecting the Forms of his publick Reception, and the Mode of opening the Negotiation, which could not, without the greatest Impropriety, be complied with, and from which he declared his Instructions did not authorize him to recede, it was thought most advisable by Hurry Punt and Meer Allum (who are invested with full Powers from their respective Governments) as well as myself, that he should be requested, after having given him a few Days for Consideration, to return to his Master, and he accordingly proceeded to him, from Bangalore, on the 24th of last Month.

We have not yet received any further Message from Tippoo; but I think it highly probable that he will soon renew his Propositions for opening a Nego-

tiation; and should he at any Time appear to be seriously disposed to acquiesce in Terms of Accommodation, which a Regard for your Honor and Interests, as well as those of the Allies, will render it incumbent upon us to demand, the strongest Considerations, both publick and private, will insure my most cordial Exertions to bring this Contest to a speedy Conclusion.

I must however confess, that although it may be possible that, in case of his other Schemes being unsuccessful, he may see the Necessity of submitting to our Demands, before the Confederate Forces shall be completely ready to move again towards his Capital, yet I see no good Reason to believe that he has any other Design, at present, than that of endeavouring to disunite the Confederates by underhand Intrigues amongst them; and I shall certainly, therefore, not relax, in the smallest Degree, in forwarding the necessary Preparations, to enable me, as soon as the Season will permit, to resume the most vigorous Prosecution of offensive Operations.

You are so well informed, by your own Records, of the Characters and Dispositions of our Allies, that I need hardly state to you, that in transacting Business with People differing so much from ourselves in Language, Manners and Customs, many Difficulties are unavoidably experienced; and I shall only assure you, that neither Temper nor Perseverance shall be wanting, on my Part, to preserve Union amongst the different Members of the Confederacy, and to draw the utmost Exertion that may be practicable from them, for promoting the general Prosperity.

I have thought it my Duty to give you the above general Statement of the Occurrences of the last Campaign, and of our present Situation; and before I conclude this Letter, I must, in Justice to the Officers and Soldiers, both of the King's and Company's Troops, who compose this Army, give my publick Testimony, that, during the Course of a Campaign, which, from a Concurrence of Circumstances, has been singularly arduous, they have manifested Patience under Fatigue and Scarcity, Gallantry in Action, and a general Spirit of Zeal for the Honor and Interests of their Country, to an Extent which, in my Opinion, has never been exceeded by any Troops whatever, and which gives them a just Claim to the warmest and most substantial Marks of your Approbation.

I have ordered the Adjutant-General, who is gone for the Recovery of his Health to Madras, to send Returns of the Loss of His Majesty's and the Honorable Company's Troops in Killed and Wounded, during the last Campaign: And Captain Kyd, Surveyor-General on the Bengal Establishment, who has accompanied me on this Service, will transmit to you, by my Direction, Sketches of the Country about Bangalore and Seringapatam, of the Action of the 15th of May, and of the Marches of the Army from the 5th of February to the 30th of August. As this latter will be an useful Geographical Document, I should recommend its being sent to Major Rennel.

I have the Honor to be,
with the greatest Respect,
Honorable Sirs,

Your most obedient and most humble Servant,
CORNWALLIS.

Camp near Bangalore,
September 7, 1791.