

Thoughts of attacking Seringapatam before the setting-in of the Monsoon, but also to destroy the heavy Iron Guns; which, for the last several Marches, had been drawn almost by the Soldiers: That the Fatigue which had prevailed amongst his Followers had likewise increased his Difficulties, by creating an alarming Deficiency in the Public Stock of Provisions, which could not be wondered at, when it was understood that Rice sold in the Buzar for a Pagoda a Seer, (about 2lbs.) and that, under this Consideration, it was not to be expected that Muntrees and Bullock-Drivers would be able to withstand the Temptation of plundering the Bags committed to their Charge on every March.

His Lordship concluded by observing, that he had been obliged to remain near Seringapatam to secure the Retreat of General Abercromby, who had advanced to Periapattam; but that he should march on the 26th to Bangalore and Vencatagherry. He requested that we would order every Bullock that could be procured to be sent immediately to Amboor, that he might be able, without Loss of Time, to furnish Supplies for the Troops, and to replace such Part of the Stock at Bangalore as he might be obliged to make Use of during the March.

We informed Lord Cornwallis, in Reply, that, from the Exertions which had been made by Government, there was the greatest Probability that we should have at Amboor, in the Course of Six Weeks, or Two Months at furthest, Six Thousand Draft and Twenty Thousand Carriage Bullocks, (the Number required by his Lordship) and that there were at present in the Neighbourhood of that Place 1,787 Draft, and 3,477 Carriage Bullocks.

A few Days ago we received Two Letters from his Lordship, dated the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ultimo and 5<sup>th</sup> Instant. By the former we were advised that he had marched on the 26th towards Bangalore, but that on coming to the Ground where he proposed to encamp, he was greatly surprized to hear that the Two Maratta Armies, commanded by Hurry Punt and Pururam Bow, (both of which he had every Reason to believe to be at the Distance of 150 Miles) were then actually within a Day's March, and that Pururam Bow's Son, with the advanced Guard, was in Sight: That this unexpected Event had naturally occasioned a total Change of his Plan, especially as he found that the Chiefs, although they had heard that the Attack of Seringapatam had been necessarily postponed till the Conclusion of the Rains, entertained no Idea of retreating towards their own Frontier, but were disposed to co-operate heartily with his Lordship in distressing Tippoo, and cutting off his Resources. That they had further assured him, at the first Meeting, that they had it in their Power to relieve the greatest Difficulties under which he laboured, viz. the Want of Grain and of Bullocks. That he felt tolerably confident he should procure a sufficient Number of the latter in their Camp to answer his immediate Exigencies, but that their Supplies of Grain, through the Means of Benjarries, were so precarious, and the Authority of the Chiefs over those People, even if they kept their Word in endeavouring to exert it, so inefficacious, that he was very apprehensive he should be held, for a considerable Time at least, in a State of wretched Dependence on the Maratta Buzar, where he would not only be obliged to pay an immense Price for a scanty Subsistence, but be exposed at all Times even to the Risk of a total Failure.

His Lordship thought it, however, so great an Object to keep 30,000 Maratta Horse in the Neighbourhood of Tippoo's Capital, that it was to be attempted almost at all Hazards; and that he had already in his Conversation with the Chiefs paved the Way for leading them towards the Sesa Country and the Vicinity of Bangalore, as soon as the Safety of the Supplies, which were following Pururam Bow, should admit of his moving so much to the Left.

His Lordship added, that several Letters had been written to him by the Maratta Chiefs during their March, to give him Notice of their Approach, but that no Letter from either of them had reached him till the Day of their Arrival, which he considered singularly unfortunate, as he would have adopted a very different Plan of Operations if he had known Eight or Ten Days before that he could have depended upon the Junction of so powerful a Force.

The concluding Paragraph of the Letter stated, that General Abercromby had marched from Periapattam on the 23<sup>d</sup> of May, and was proceeding towards the Head of the Gaut, without any Interruption from the Enemy, leaving Four Iron Eighteen-pounders, which his Cattle could not remove, and which he could not totally destroy, at Periapattam, as well as a small Quantity of Provisions and Stores; and that the General expected to descend the Gaut on the 27th.

Lord Cornwallis's Letter of the 5<sup>th</sup> Instant advises us, that it was his Lordship's Intention to move the next Day towards Nagamungalum, to which Place the Benjarries of the Two Maratta Armies were to direct their March, and which, as well as the Roads leading to it from the Northward, it was consequently very necessary to take great Care to protect. That Tippoo still remained with his whole Force near to Seringapatam, and that no Judgment could be formed till the Cavary was on the Point of becoming unfordable, which would be the Case in a few Days, whether he (Tippoo) would determine to make Head against the Confederate Armies in that Quarter, or endeavour to disturb the Southern Provinces.

His Lordship pressed us not to lose Sight of the great Object of providing Bullocks and Grain, and of sending Supplies of Arrack and Camp Equipage to Amboor: That these, and various other Measures, he conceived to be absolutely necessary, upon the Supposition that the War might continue longer than we expected; for that although Tippoo had repeatedly expressed an earnest Desire for Peace, his Lordship was by no Means convinced that the Enemy was prepared to make the Sacrifices that the Confederates might think they they had a Right to expect.

Lord Cornwallis proceeded to inform us, that his Wants in Money would be pressing and extensive; that the Supply of the Army during the Rains, and its Equipment for the Field, exclusive of the Corps under General Abercromby, could not be estimated at less than between Thirty and Forty Lacks of Rupees; and he desired us therefore to take our Measures accordingly. He added, that he would have us consider whether it would not be advisable to take some Assistance from the Treasure sent out on the Company's Ships, which was destined for China; and that whatever we might resolve upon would have his Sanction. In the mean Time he desired that we would send Seven or Eight Lacks of Rupees to Vellore, to supply the Wants of the Army, as soon as the Communication was secured.

It was a peculiar Satisfaction to us at this Time to reflect, that we had actually in our Treasury the full Amount of what his Lordship represented to be necessary for him during the Rains, and for the subsequent Equipment of his Army, notwithstanding the ample Advances made for your Investment.

We have been thus particular in detailing to your Honorable Court the Transactions of the War, because the Subject is important; and we can readily conceive the Anxiety you must feel to receive Advices by every Opportunity.

We have the Pleasure to inform you, that the Fort of Coopee surrendered to the Nizam's Army on the 17<sup>th</sup> of April.