

as he has a general Knowledge of the Operations carrying on in Carolina; as well as of those that are probable here (concerning which I have had several confidential Conversations with him. I beg Leave to refer your Lordship to him for Particulars.

I have the Honor to inclose Copies of some lately intercepted Dispatches.

Extract of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to the Marquis de la Fayette, dated New Windsor, May 31, 1781.

IN a Letter which I wrote to Baron Stuben on the 16th Instant, I desired him to inform you, as I did not know at that Time where you might be, that I had good Reason to believe a Detachment of between 1500 and 2000 Men had sailed from New York a few Days before; I now have it confirmed, and I think you may either look for them in Chesapeake or further Southward.

Your Determination to avoid an Engagement with your present Force is certainly judicious. I hope the Pennsylvanians have began their March before this, but I have no Information of it. General Wayne has been pressed, both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as much Expedition as possible, and extraordinary Powers are given to him to enable him to procure Provisions.

Extract of a private intercepted Letter from General Washington to the Marquis de la Fayette, dated New Windsor, May 31, 1781.

IHAVE just returned from Weatherfield, at which I expected to have met the Count de Rochambeau and Count de Barras; but the British Fleet having made its Appearance off Block Island, the Admiral did not think it prudent to leave Newport. Count Rochambeau was only attended by Chevalier Chatellux. Generals Knox and Dupontail were with me.

Upon a full Consideration of our Affairs in every Point of View, an Attempt upon New York with its present Garrison (which, by Estimation, is reduced to 4500 Regular Troops and about 3000 Irregulars) was deemed preferable to a Southern Operation, as we had not the Command of the Water. The Reasons which induced this Determination were, the Danger to be apprehended from the approaching Heats, the inevitable Dissipation and Loss of Men by so long a March, and the Difficulty of Transportation; but above all, it was thought that we had a tolerable Prospect of expelling the Enemy, or obliging them to withdraw Part of their Force from the Southward, which last would give the most effectual Relief to those States. The French Troops are to march this Way as soon as certain Circumstances will admit, leaving about 200 Men at Providence with the heavy Stores, and 300 Militia upon Rhode Island to secure the Works.

I am endeavouring to prevail upon the States to fill up their Battalions for the Campaign, if they cannot do it upon better Terms, and to send in ample and regular Supplies of Provision. Thus you perceive it will be some Time before our Plan can be ripe for Execution, and that a Failure on our Part in Men and Supplies may defeat it; but I am in Hopes that the States in this Quarter will exert themselves to attain what has long been a favourite, and is an important Object to them.

Copy of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to General Sullivan, dated Head Quarters, New Windsor, May 29, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

IHave been favoured with your Two Letters of the 2d and 17th of May, the former reached me at Weatherfield, after I had met the Count de

Rochambeau at that Place; from which Time to the present Moment, my whole Attention has been so occupied by a Variety of Concerns, that I have been hitherto involuntarily prevented from doing myself the Pleasure of writing to you.

No Arguments were necessary to convince me of the great Public Utility, which would result from the Success of the Plan you proposed, laying before Congress.—Had I been unapprised of the Advantages which might be derived to our Cause from a successful Attempt, or even a powerful Diversion, in that Quarter, the Reasons you have offered would have carried irrefragable Demonstration with them, and induced me to be of your Opinion. But the perplexed, distressed, and embarrassed State of our Affairs on Account of Supplies, (with which you are well acquainted;) the languid Efforts of the States to procure Men, and the insuperable Difficulties in the Way of Transportation, would, I apprehend, have rendered the Scheme (however devoutly to be wished and desired) abortive in the first Instance.—And, I must inform you, there is yet another Obstacle, which makes the Attempt you have suggested *absolutely impracticable*, with the Means you propose, but which I dare not commit to Paper, for Fear of the Misfortune, which has already happened to some of my Letters.

You will have seen before the Receipt of this, by my Public Letter to Congress of the 27th Instant, the Result of the Deliberations of the Count de Rochambeau and myself at Weathersfield.—That Plan, upon the maturest Consideration, and after combining all the present Circumstances and future Prospects, appeared (though precarious) far the most eligible of any we could possibly devise.—The Object was considered to be of great Magnitude, and more within our Reach than any other.—The Weakness of the Garrison of New-York, the Central Position for drawing together Men and Supplies, and the Spur, which an Attempt against that Place would give to every Exertion, were among the Reasons which prompted to that Undertaking, and which promised the fairest Prospect of Success, unless the Enemy should recall a considerable Part of their Force from the Southward; and even in this Case, the same Measure which might produce Disappointment in one Quarter, would certainly, in the Event, afford the greatest Relief in another.

While an Opportunity presents itself of striking the Enemy a fatal Blow, I will persuade myself the concurring Exertions of Congress, of the several States immediately concerned, and of every Individual in them who is well affected to our Cause, will be united in yielding every possible Aid on the Occasion. At this Crisis, while I rejoice at the Appointment of the Minister of Finance, I have sincerely to regret, that the Ministers of the other Departments have not also been appointed, especially a Minister of War. At the same Time I am happy to learn, the Mode of Promotion is on the Point of being finally established.

With the highest Sentiments of Regard and Esteem, I am, &c.

(Signed) G. WASHINGTON.

Hon. General Sullivan.

Copy of a Letter from the Marquis de la Fayette to General Washington, dated Wilton, North Side of James River, May 18, 1781.

DEAR GENERAL,

HAVING been directed by General Greene to take Command of the Troops in Virginia, I have also received Orders from him, that every Account from this Quarter be immediately transmitted to Congress and to your Excellency: In Obedience to which I shall have the Honor to relate our Movements