

Major General Reidesel exerted himself to bring up a Part of the Left Wing, and arrived in Time to charge the Enemy with Regularity and Bravery.

Just as the Light closed, the Enemy gave Ground on all Sides, and left us compleatly Masters of the Field of Battle, with the Loss of about 500 Men on their Side, and, as supposed, thrice that Number wounded.

The Darkness preventing a Pursuit, the Prisoners were few.

The Behaviour of the Officers and Men in general was exemplary. Brigadier-General Frazer took his Position in the Beginning of the Day with great Judgment, and sustained the Action with constant Presence of Mind and Vigour. Brigadier-General Hamilton was the whole Time engaged, and acquitted himself with great Honour, Activity, and good Conduct. The Artillery in general was distinguished, and the Brigade under Captain Jones, who was killed in the Action, was conspicuously so.

The Army lay upon their Arms the Night of the 19th, and the next Day took a Position nearly within Cannon Shot of the Enemy, fortifying their Right, and extending their Left so as to cover the Meadows through which the great River runs, and where the Batteaux and Hospitals were placed. The 47th Regiment, and the Regiment of Hesse Hanau, with a Corps of Provincials, encamped in the Meadows as a further Security.

It was soon found that no Fruits, Honour excepted, were attained by the preceding Victory; the Enemy working with redoubled Ardor to strengthen their Left; their Right was unattackable already.

On our Side it became expedient to erect strong Redoubts for the Protection of the Magazines and Hospital, not only against a sudden Attack, but also for their Security in Case of a March to turn the Enemy's Flank.

21st. A Messenger arrived from Sir Harry Clinton, with a Letter in Cyphers, informing me of his Intention to attack Fort Montgomery in about Ten Days: from the Date of his Letter, which was the 10th of September. This was the only Messenger of many that I apprehend were dispatched by Sir William Howe and him, that had reached my Camp since the Beginning of August. He was sent back the same Night to inform Sir Harry of my Situation, and of the Necessity of a Diversion to oblige General Gates to detach from his Army; and my Intention to wait favourable Events in that Position, if possible, to the 12th of October.

In the Course of the Two following Days, Two Officers in Disguise, and other confidential Persons, were dispatched by different Routes with verbal Messages to the same Effect; and I continued fortifying my Camp, and watching the Enemy, whose Numbers increased every Day.

3^d October. I thought it advisable to diminish the Soldiers' Ration, in order to lengthen out the Provisions, to which Measure the Army submitted with the utmost Chearfulness. The Difficulties of a Retreat to Canada were clearly foreseen, as was the Dilemma, should the Retreat be effected, of leaving at Liberty such an Army as General Gates's to act against Sir William Howe.

This Consideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide Events as long as possible, and I reasoned thus: The Expedition I commanded was evidently meant at first to be *hazarded*. Circumstances might require it should be *devoted*; a critical Junction of Mr. Gates's Force with Mr. Washington might possibly decide the Fate of the War; the Failure of my Junction with Sir Harry Clinton, or the Loss of my Retreat to Canada, could only be a partial Misfortune.

7th. In this Situation Things continued 'till the 7th, when no Intelligence having been received of the expected Co-operation, and Four or Five Days for our limited Stay in the Camp only remained, it was judged advisable to make a Movement to the Enemy's Left, not only to discover whether there were any possible Means of forcing a Passage should it be necessary to advance, or of dislodging him for the Convenience of Retreat, but also to cover a Forage of the Army, which was in the greatest Distress on Account of the Scarcity.

A Detachment of 1500 Regular Troops, with 2 Twelve-Pounders, 2 Howitzers, and 6 Six-Pounders, were ordered to move, and was commanded by

myself, having with me Major-General Phillips, Major-General Reidesel, and Brigadier-General Frazer. The Guard of the Camp upon the Heights was left to Brigadiers-General Hamilton and Speicht; the Redoubts and the Plain to Brigadier-General Goll; and as the Force of the Enemy immediately in their Front consisted of more than double their Numbers, it was not possible to augment the Corps that marched beyond the Numbers above stated.

I formed the Troops within Three Quarters of a Mile of the Enemy's Left; and Captain Frazer's Rangers, with Indians and Provincials, had Orders to go by secret Paths in the Woods to gain the Enemy's Rear, and by shewing themselves there to keep them in Check.

The further Operations intended were prevented by a very sudden and rapid Attack of the Enemy on our Left, where the British Grenadiers were posted to support the Left Wing of the Line. Major Ackland at the Head of them sustained the Attack with great Resolution; but the Enemy's great Numbers enabling them in a few Minutes to extend the Attack along the Front of the Germans, which were immediately on the Right of the Grenadiers, no Part of that Body could be removed to make a second Line to the Flank where the Strefs of the Fire lay. The Right was at that Time unengaged; but it was soon observed that the Enemy were marching a large Corps round their Flank to endeavour cutting off their Retreat. The Light Infantry and Part of the 24th Regiment, which were at that Post, were therefore ordered to form a second Line, and to secure the Return of the Troops into Camp.

While this Movement was proceeding, the Enemy pushed a fresh and strong Reinforcement to renew the Action upon the Left, which, overpowered by so great a Superiority, gave Way, and the Light Infantry and 24th Regiment were obliged to make a quick Movement to save that Point from being entirely carried, in doing which Brigadier-General Frazer was mortally wounded.

The Danger to which the Lines were exposed becoming at this Moment of the most serious Nature, Orders were given to Majors-General Phillips and Reidesel to cover the Retreat, while such Troops as were most ready for the Purpose returned for the Defence of them. The Troops retreated hard pressed, but in good Order. They were obliged to leave 6 Pieces of Cannon, all the Horses having been killed; and most of the Artillery Men, who had behaved as usual with the utmost Bravery, under the Command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The Troops had scarcely entered the Camp, when it was stormed with great Fury, the Enemy rushing to the Lines under a severe Fire of Grape Shot and Small Arms. The Post of the Light Infantry under Lord Belcarres, assisted by some of the Line, who threw themselves by Order into those Entrenchments, was defended with great Spirit; and the Enemy, led on by General Arnolt, was finally repulsed, and the General wounded; but unhappily the Entrenchments of the German Reserve, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Brijmen, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be recovered they never were so; and the Enemy by that Misfortune gained an Opening on our Right and Rear. The Night put an End to the Action.

Under the Disadvantages thus apparent in our Situation, the Army was ordered to quit the present Position during the Night, and take Post upon the Height above the Hospital; thus, by an entire Change of Front, to reduce the Enemy to form a new Disposition. This Movement was effected with great Order and without Loss, though all the Artillery and Camp were removed at the same Time. The Army continued offering Battle to the Enemy in their new Position the whole Day of the 8th.

8th. Intelligence was now received that the Enemy were marching to turn the Right, and no Means could prevent this Measure but retiring towards Saratoga. The Army began to move at Nine o'Clock at Night; Major-General Reidesel commanding the Van Guard, and Major General Phillips the Rear.

This Retreat, though within Musquet Shot of the Enemy, and encumbered with all the Baggage of