

our further advance in describing and pointing out the enemy's position.

Major Wigstone bivouacked here for the night and was undisturbed; and early next morning (the 18th instant), I moved on with the force from Kyomtano, carrying seven days' provisions. We passed Major Wigstone's party, and moved with our left wing, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sturt, consisting of H. M.'s 51st K.O.L.I., and the 67th B.N.I. in front, followed by the guns and irregular cavalry, and leaving the right wing to bring up the rear and to furnish the rear-guard.

As the road was greatly obstructed and the progress slow, I took the opportunity to send back to Kyomtano, with some irregulars, the sick and wounded of Major Wigstone's party; the escort rejoined us again with the empty doolies.

After going about two miles through forest, and passing breastworks from which only an occasional shot was fired, our guides, instead of going further by the road we had traversed on the 11th instant, turned sharp off to the left; along this path the obstructions and felled trees continued for about a mile, and the road was so rough that one of the ammunition waggons was overturned and the pole broken; it was necessary to leave it, and the ammunition boxes were packed on spare hackeries.

We arrived at noon at a piece of water on our right, where I halted for an hour to refresh the men; and at one P.M. we moved on; the obstructions were very great, and it occupied about two hours getting a mile further; there was some firing also, and the enemy were reported to be in a position close at hand.

We at last had a very sharp fire opened on us from the left. A fire had been lighted in that quarter to obscure the vision, and the whole place was obstructed and entangled with abattis in front and along the left; part of the 67th N.I., with the rifles, engaged the enemy to the left; and we managed to clear the path to the front so as to advance the 51st K.O.L.I., and to bring the guns and rockets to bear upon the enemy, whose position, however, was so covered and hidden that we could only judge of it from the direction of the fire on our troops.

The road or path was at length sufficiently cleared, and the charge was ordered; the breastwork was most gallantly carried by H. M.'s 51st K.O.L.I. and the 67th N.I., Captain Singleton, 51st Regiment, leading the advance. Ensign Boileau, of the 67th N. I. was, I regret to say, killed, while gallantly attacking the enemy on our left flank.

The enemy's loss I was unable to ascertain, but his force here consisted of 1,000 men, with one gun, which was carried off, and Myat-toon was present in person. This I learned from a prisoner who was taken.

We lost no time in following up the enemy, but after proceeding along an open road for about a mile, I thought it advisable, it being nearly 5 P.M., to halt at a piece of water, Ngyoung-Kymug, said to be distant about three miles from Kyomtano, but with a heavy jungle intervening, in which the enemy were reported to be in force.

At 8 P.M. I fired, at the request of Captain Smith, Deputy Commissioner, three signal rockets for the information of Captain Fytche, who had promised to cooperate to the westward and northward of Kyomcazen; they were replied to by guns, and during the night, on the report that the enemy were felling trees close in our front, a few shot and shells were fired at them, with good effect I believe.

On the morning of the 19th instant, at 7 A.M., we moved on, the right wing leading, and the left wing in rear of the Artillery. H. M.'s 80th Regiment formed the advance guard, and was followed by the Sappers clearing the road; the enemy's position was described as being at Na-young-Goun-lya, the head of the piece of water on our right, and along the edge of which, or very near it, the road lay. I expected to find the enemy posted on the opposite bank, and that we should have to come under a flanking fire before being able to reach his right and turn the position where the nullah is dry. It did not seem reasonable to expect that his left flank would be found unprotected, and I therefore did not think it worth while to pass a party across the water to try that flank; it would have been useless, as I afterwards found that an extensive and impassable marsh, though invisible from our side, covered his left flank; the forest was so dense on our left that to cut a new road direct from the nullah, entirely round the enemy's right, would have been very laborious, and would have occupied a very long time, and the sickness amongst our troops had become so alarming that great danger would have accrued from the delay. I was withal unwilling to diverge from the path our guides led us; there had been already so much uncertainty and difficulty about finding the road, that it seemed the safest plan to get at the enemy as speedily as we could, and I trusted to a rapid advance, supported by our guns and rockets, and relied on carrying the enemy's breastwork on the right, the moment we should reach it.

On coming opposite his left flank the firing commenced, and here our rockets were advanced and opened fire; the 4th Seikh Local Regiment were sent on to support the 80th Regiment, and the 18th Royal Irish in support of them; the Sappers worked away at the path, which was much entangled with wood, and the guns were shortly got into position and opened; the firing had however become very heavy, and it was reported to me that Major Wigstone was wounded. On reaching the front I found that Major Armstrong was also wounded, as well as many other officers and men, and that the fire of the enemy on the path leading up to the breastwork was so heavy, that our advanced party had not succeeded in carrying it; the most strenuous exertions were made, and Lieutenant Johnson, the only remaining officer of the 4th Seikh Local Regiment, persevered most bravely, but it only increased the loss. The 80th and Seikhs then went on in the hopes of getting round the extreme right of the enemy; the jungle, however, was so thick, and the abattis so strong, that our men got dispersed, and could not get through it.

It was at this point that the 18th Royal Irish came up, and the fire of musketry and grape was so heavy that they also got scattered and sustained great loss. Lieutenant Cockburn was wounded. I was here joined by Major Holdich, now in command of the right wing.

Although it was difficult from the dense smoke, and under so heavy a fire, to discern exactly what was between us and the breastwork to be assailed, I succeeded at last in ascertaining that there was no water, and no obstacle that could not be easily surmounted, if the troops could pass through the enemy's fire, a distance of only 20 or 30 yards. The "assembly" was accordingly sounded, with a view of getting together as many men of the right wing as could be collected.

In the meantime Major Reid of the Artillery, brought up in the most gallant manner his

