

The success, not only of our final offensive, but also of our advance down the railway for 120 miles southwards, was due in no small measure to the skill and energy displayed by Brigadier-General G. D. Price, C.M.G., who was in immediate command of the Allied troops on my southern front during the whole period dealt with in this report.

Final Evacuation.

12. On the withdrawal of the Allied troops from the fighting front I was compelled by ill-health to give up temporarily the command of the Murmansk Force, and the final evacuation was carried out under the direction of Brigadier-General H. C. Jackson, C.B., D.S.O., in accordance with previously arranged plans. These worked smoothly, although towards the close of our railway movements several bridges between Murmansk and Kandalaksha were burnt by Bolshevik sympathisers, and the presence of a party of freebooters near the last-named village necessitated punitive action. Any further risk, however, was avoided by arranging for direct troopship sailings from Kem and Kandalaksha respectively in the case of those units which were the last for evacuation.

Administrative Services.

13. Throughout the whole period under review the work thrown on the Administrative Staff has been heavy and varied. For it has included not only the necessary services for British, Allied and local troops, but also the economic administration of the whole occupied area (sanitation, labour control, etc.) the equipment of the newly-raised Russian forces and provision for their future needs, and the organisation and training of the Russian administrative services.

Owing to the lack of roads and of fixed transport establishments no system of supply on orthodox lines was possible, and it was found necessary to devise special expedients to meet the requirements of each stage of the operations. The railway was utilised to the fullest possible extent, and provided the equivalent of second-line transport for columns operating in its vicinity; but in all cases the necessity arose for the laborious building up of forward supply dumps before each successive advance. For this purpose, and for the daily replenishment of supplies with the troops, all forms of transport were used, pack transport, travois, local carts, W.D. vehicles, horse, reindeer and dog sledges, boats, and, in the later stages, light Ford box vans.

The organisation and training of the Russian administrative services proved a task of considerable difficulty, owing to an entire lack of Russian officers with any knowledge of administrative or departmental duties, and progress at first was slow and disheartening. By the time of our withdrawal, however, the Russians were able to take over all administrative arrangements with little noticeable dislocation or inconvenience.

Political.

14. The political problems with which I have been confronted and the means adopted by me for dealing with them have been reported already, and further reference to them now appears unnecessary.

The relations between my Headquarters and the local Russian Authorities have always been

most friendly, and the various officers commanding Allied contingents under my orders have invariably lent me their loyal support.

15. I wish to take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to Rear-Admiral J. F. E. Green, C.B., for the ready and valuable assistance lent me at all times by the Royal Navy.

The gallant work of the lake flotilla in face of heavy odds calls also for special reference; whilst it is difficult for me to express adequately the debt I owe to the extraordinary zeal, courage and skill displayed by the R.A.F. units serving under me.

16. I enclose lists giving the names of officers and other ranks whose services I consider worthy of recognition.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) C. M. MAYNARD,

Major-General,

Commanding Allied Forces, Murmansk.

APPENDIX B to DESPATCH No. 4.

From Major-General Sir W. E. Ironside, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding Allied Forces, Archangel.

To General Lord Rawlinson, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., General, Commanding-in-Chief, North Russia.

War Office,

1st November, 1919.

SIR,—

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my command during the period 11th August, 1919, to 27th September, 1919.

1. I had already received instructions telegraphically from you, on your appointment in England as Commander-in-Chief North Russia, to carry out any necessary offensive operations, with a view to disengaging the forces under my command and carry out a complete evacuation. I was able to inform you on your arrival of the successful operations on the Dvina carried out by General Jackson's Brigade.

2. The efforts of the British training staff had organised and trained a Russian force of between 20,000 and 30,000 men of all ranks, sufficient in themselves to continue the defence, but in my opinion it was doubtful whether they had sufficient moral to stand by themselves.

3. The chief problems before me were:—

(i) The disengaging of British troops on all fronts and their substitution by Russian troops.

(ii) The substitution of a Russian Military Administration for the existing British one.

4. In accordance with the pre-arranged plans, already submitted to you, sufficient stores to take the Russians through the winter were handed over and the remainder shipped to England. All those persons desirous of leaving Archangel, and who had a call upon the British Government, were shipped to their various destinations. Work was exceedingly heavy and the Administrative Staff was tried to its utmost.

5. The withdrawal and final evacuation of the British forces was effected without the loss