

accounted for, either as killed or prisoners. In view of recruiting possibilities, and the tactical importance of securing a footing on the flank of the enemy's line of communication, I established in the village a permanent post, found by my Karelian Regiment.

I had for some time contemplated the advisability of a sudden and simultaneous attack on the enemy's posts on the railway to as far south as Segeja. From the intelligence at my disposal I knew this to be a feasible undertaking, but, as I was averse from a raid only, and was anxious to hold Segeja should the enterprise prove successful, the question arose as to whether I was justified in thus extending my obligations. I placed before the War Office my reasons for thinking that this justification existed, and the attack was sanctioned, the decision regarding my remaining in occupation of any advanced positions I might gain being left to my discretion. The operation was carried out on 18th February and met with complete success. Every post was captured, and the enemy suffered heavily, his casualties in killed and prisoners alone amounting to 150, or nearly half the estimated strength of his garrison, whilst much booty, including machine guns and rolling stock, fell into our hands. It is certain, too, that further severe losses were inflicted, since enemy reinforcements arriving by rail were subjected to such close and heavy machine-gun fire that they were unable to detrain, and it was with great difficulty that the train was able to withdraw. On the following day the Bolsheviks made a determined effort to recapture Segeja, their infantry being supported by gun fire from an armoured train. The attack broke down, heavy punishment being once again inflicted; and latest reports point to a general enemy withdrawal of some 15 miles. Our casualties were exceedingly slight. The details of the enterprise were arranged by the G.O.C., 237th Infantry Brigade, and the several attacks were carried out by British, Canadian, Serbian and Russian detachments, all of whom displayed high qualities of courage and endurance.

The capture intact of the 400-foot span bridge over the Segeja River (the last of any magnitude between that place and Petrozavodsk), and the opportunity now opened up for rebuilding the bridge over the Onda (20 miles to the north), which is of equal span and was destroyed by the Bolsheviks last July, are matters of very great importance. Had the operation not been carried out before the end of February, it is certain that at least a year must have elapsed before railway communication with the south could have been reopened.

21. Of the Allied troops under my command, the Serbian battalion has proved an invaluable asset since the commencement of my operations, and has never failed to display fighting qualities of the highest order.

There has been little scope for the employment of guns, but the French Artillery Brigade has been the backbone of my artillery strength from the outset.

Circumstances have forced me to employ the Italian Expeditionary Force almost entirely at the base and on my line of communication. Here all ranks have carried out in a most praiseworthy manner the uncongenial but all-important tasks, on the successful performance of which depends the efficiency of the troops in the fighting line.

Of my own troops, those of the small contingent who accompanied me originally merit a special word of praise for their staunchness during more than eight months of campaigning under exceptionally trying conditions; whilst the Canadian detachment has gained distinction on many occasions by its pluck and resourcefulness.

22. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation of the cordial manner in which Rear-Admiral J. F. E. Green, C.B., the Senior Naval Officer, White Sea, and his staff have lent me their willing assistance in the many matters necessitating co-operation between the sea and land force.

23. I attach lists giving the names of officers and other ranks whose good services I consider worthy of recognition. Further, I have had the pleasure of bringing to the notice of The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty certain officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines who have been attached temporarily to my command, and have performed meritorious service.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most Obedient Servant,

(Sd.) C. M. MAYNARD,
Major-General,

Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces,
Murmansk.

DESPATCH No. 3.

From: Major-General Sir W. E. Ironside, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., lately Commanding-in-Chief Allied Forces, Archangel.

To: The Secretary of State for War, War Office.

War Office,

1st November, 1919.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1st October, 1918, to 11th August, 1919:—

1.—*Period before the European Armistice.*

The main objectives of the Allied Force, which had landed in North Russia during the summer of 1918, were:—

(a) The reconstruction of any available Russian or Allied Forces in Russia to oppose Germany.

(b) The prevention of access to the sea through Archangel and Murmansk should the Germans continue their advance into Russia.

On landing in October, 1918, and on taking over Command from Major-General Poole, I found a Provisional Government installed under the Presidency of M. Tchaikovsky.

The Allied Forces available were as follows:

(a) Contingents from Great Britain, France, America, Italy and Poland, numbering 14,000 men.

(b) Russian Forces numbering 1,500, consisting largely of returned prisoners of war.