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MONDAY, 11 AUGUST, 1919.

War Office,
11th August, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:—

General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
28th June, 1919.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward a despatch describing events in Syria and Palestine, subsequent to the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey on October 31st, 1918.

I have taken the opportunity in this despatch to give a brief general summary of the campaigns in this theatre; and to express my thanks to some of those who have assisted me during my command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Part I.—Events from the armistice with Turkey up to March, 1919.

Execution of the Terms of the Armistice.

1. The situation of my troops and of the Turkish troops in Northern Syria, at the con-

clusion of the armistice with Turkey, by the terms of which hostilities ceased at noon on October 31st, was approximately as follows:—

The 5th Cavalry Division and a portion of the Arab Army occupied Aleppo; the Turkish VIIIth Army, formed of the remnants of the defeated IVth, VIIth and VIIIth Armies, and estimated at about 5,000 strong, having withdrawn northwards along the Alexandretta and Muslimie roads. The Turkish IInd Army, about 11,000 strong, occupying Cilicia from Alexandretta to Bozanti, was the only other formed body of Turkish troops to be reckoned with.

The remainder of the Desert Mounted Corps was still in the Damascus area; the Australian Mounted Division was commencing to move from Damascus to Homs; while the 4th Cavalry Division, which was weak from sickness, had remained in the Baalbek area.

Of the XXIst Corps, moving up the Syrian coast, the 7th (Indian) Division had reached Tripoli, the Detachement Francais de Palestine-Syrie Beirut, and the 54th Division a point half-way from Haifa to Beirut.

The 75th Division was engaged in clearing the battlefield and improving communications in the coastal plain from Kalkilieh to Haifa;

and the 3rd (Indian) Division, less one brigade already at Semakh, was in process of taking over from the 10th Division similar work in the hills further east. The 10th Division had commenced to concentrate in the Ramleh area.

The 53rd and 60th Divisions in the Ramleh area were being withdrawn to Egypt, by sea and rail respectively, and the brigade of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division detached, under Chaytor's Force at Amman, was about to rejoin the rest of the Division at Surafend, preparatory to the move of this Division to Rafa. One Australian Light Horse Regiment and a battalion of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade (at Jerusalem) remained at Amman.

2. The terms of the armistice which concerned my command prescribed the surrender of all garrisons in Syria and the Hejaz, the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Cilicia, and the immediate demobilisation of the Turkish Army, except such as might be considered necessary by the Allies for the maintenance of order. The Allies were to control the railways, and to occupy the Taurus Tunnel system; and had the right to occupy any part of the Armenian Vilayets in case of disorder occurring. The disposal of the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Turkish Army was to be decided by the Allies.

3. The Turkish commanders adopted from the first an attitude of obstruction to the execution of the terms of the armistice.

My first concern was to obtain the withdrawal from Syria and Cilicia of the Turkish Army east of the Taurus, with which my troops had been engaged up to the conclusion of the armistice.

On November 12th my conditions for the withdrawal of his army, in compliance with the armistice terms, were communicated to Nihad Pasha, who had succeeded to the command of the IIInd Turkish Army. I laid down a withdrawal in three stages, to be completed by December 15th, by which date the whole Turkish Army was to be west of Bozanti, where it was to demobilise.

I subsequently agreed to an extension of this date to December 26th.

The Turkish command first pretended ignorance of the terms and duration of the armistice; and then attempted to interpret the terms in a sense directly contrary both to the letter and spirit of the armistice. Finally, after all possible excuses for procrastination had been exhausted, the Turkish withdrawal commenced on November 29th.

Alexandretta had been occupied by a battalion of French troops on November 14th, the Turkish garrison of the town only evacuating it after repeated refusals to do so had been met by a threat that a landing would be made by force if the town was not instantly evacuated.

During the withdrawal, Nihad Pasha again attempted to evade the terms of the armistice by leaving behind large numbers of armed soldiers in the guise of gendarmerie, with the object of embarrassing the Allies and obtaining Turkish control of Cilicia. The withdrawal to Bozanti was eventually completed within the time limit fixed; not without further attempts by the Turkish Commander at delay and evasion.

Occupation of Cilicia.

4. To protect and secure control of the Bagdad Railway on the withdrawal of the Turkish

Army, I ordered the French detachment under my command to establish posts along the railway from Islahie to the Taurus Tunnels.

In accordance with the above, two battalions of the French Armenian Legion disembarked at Mersina during the third week in December, and proceeded, together with the battalion which had already disembarked at Alexandretta, to establish posts along the Bagdad Railway, from Islahie to Bozanti.

I also ordered a commission of officers to proceed to the Taurus Tunnels to examine their condition and report on the work necessary to maintain them. A battalion of Pioneers and a field company, Royal Engineers, were subsequently sent to the Taurus to assist in the maintenance of the tunnels, which had not been completed and still required to be lined.

5. The policy adopted by Nihad Pasha of leaving behind large numbers of Turkish soldiers in Cilicia as "gendarmerie," and the agitation which he and his agents encouraged, resulted in producing a disturbed state in Cilicia. The presence of Armenian troops, who were naturally mindful of the wrongs suffered by their countrymen in the past, accentuated the unrest between the Turkish and Armenian elements of the population. Collisions between Turks and Armenians were frequent; and at the beginning of January I decided to reinforce the troops in Cilicia by sending there a British Brigade and Cavalry Regiment. Owing to shipping difficulties, this brigade did not reach Cilicia before the middle of February. It relieved, along the railway, the detachments of the Armenian Legion, which were then concentrated by battalions at central points. The arrival of this brigade and the gradual weeding out and reduction of the Turkish gendarmerie restored confidence and security.

Extension of occupation North and North-East of Aleppo.

6. To the north and north-east of Aleppo I took similar steps to secure control of the railway and to ensure law and order in the surrounding districts.

In this area, too, the Turks were extremely obstructive. Ali Ihsan, Commander of the VIth Turkish Army, which had retired from Mesopotamia to about Nisibin, adopted a similar policy to that of Nihad Pasha in Cilicia. He attempted to evade the demobilisation terms by maintaining large armed bodies under the name of gendarmerie; and endeavoured by propaganda to create an anti-British and anti-Armenian spirit in the country beyond the immediate occupation of my troops.

The result of this propaganda showed itself in a general feeling of insecurity among the inhabitants; continual reports and threats of impending Armenian massacres came in; and it was evident that only military occupation of the principal towns and firm action with regard to Ali Ihsan would avert serious outbreaks.

I accordingly ordered the occupation of Killis, Aintab, Marash and Urfa, as soon as supply arrangements would permit, and the establishment of posts along the Bagdad Railway as far as Arab Punar. I also demanded the removal from his command of Ali Ihsan.

To enable the Desert Mounted Corps to carry out these movements the 28th Infantry Brigade from the 7th Division was ordered to join the Desert Mounted Corps.

7. The difficulties of supply and movement in Northern Syria during the winter were great. The bridge over the Orontes at Hama, on the broad gauge line from Rayak to Aleppo, could not be repaired till February, and roads were in a bad state and became impassable after heavy rain. Consequently, the occupation of the places mentioned at the end of the preceding paragraph was considerably delayed.

Killis and Aintab were occupied on December 24th, and a series of posts along the Bagdad Railway as far as Arab Punar, had been established by January 13th. But Marash and Birijik could not be occupied till towards the end of February; and it was the third week in March before the supply situation had improved sufficiently to make the occupation of Urfa possible.

8. During December and January the attitude of Ali Ihsan with regard to compliance with the terms of the armistice continued most unsatisfactory. Finally, at the suggestion of the War Office, I proceeded to Constantinople at the beginning of February, and interviewed the Turkish Foreign Minister and War Minister, to whom I stated the numerous breaches of the armistice committed by Turkish commanders in my area, and laid down certain conditions to be accepted by them and communicated to the Turkish authorities in my area.

This resulted in the removal of Ali Ihsan from his command about the end of February.

9. His removal and the demobilisation of the 6th Army in the Nisibin area and the 2nd Army West of Bozanti practically put an end to any further trouble or menace from the Turkish armed forces.

The conditions, however, both in Cilicia and in the area North and North-east of Aleppo have remained unsettled, and have from time to time caused anxiety. The repatriation of Armenians and the restoration of their property are matters of difficulty, and a revival of Turco-Armenian hostility in the form of riots has always been a danger. Propaganda by agents of the Committee of Union and Progress has been active, and armed bands of brigands are not uncommon in these provinces. The presence of troops in the principal towns has enabled order to be maintained, but their withdrawal would result in general disorder and insecurity, for the Turkish authorities are in no position at present to enforce order in the country.

Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory.

10. I had on the 22nd October, 1918, divided the Occupied Enemy Territory under my control into three Areas, viz.:—

(1) Occupied Enemy Territory (South) comprising the old Turkish Sandjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre.

(2) Occupied Enemy Territory (North), afterwards known as O.E.T. (West), comprising the town of Beirut, Sandjaks of Beirut, the Lebanon, Tripoli, Ladikiya and the Cazas of Jisr-Esh-Shoghur, Antioch, Haran, Bailan and Alexandretta.

(3) Occupied Enemy Territory (East), comprising all districts lying to the East of O.E.T. (South) and O.E.T. (North), up to the Northern limits of the Cazas of Jebel-Saman and El Bab.

After the occupation of Cilicia it became necessary to form another area of Occupied Enemy Territory, and, on the 19th January, 1919, I formed a new Area, consisting of the Vilayet of Adana less the Caza of Selefke (or Ichili). This was to be known as Occupied Enemy Territory (North), the district referred to in (2) being henceforth called Occupied Enemy Territory (West). At the same time, Occupied Enemy Territory (East) was extended to include that part of the Caza of Killis lying South and West of the Muslimie-Katma railway, and also the village areas of Azaz and Niam (lying North of the Katma-Muslimie-Jerablus railway).

The Area to the North of Occupied Enemy Territory (East) and to the East of Occupied Enemy Territory (North) has not been treated as Occupied Enemy Territory, but has continued to be administered by Turkish officials under the general control of the General Officer Commanding Desert Mounted Corps. The Administration in this Area is dependent on the Ottoman Government at Constantinople for funds.

I placed the following Chief Administrators in charge of the four Areas. They are all directly responsible to me:—

O.E.T.A. (South): Major-General Sir A. W. Money, K.C.B., C.S.I., Headquarters, Jerusalem.

O.E.T.A. (West): Colonel de Piépape, C.B., of the French Army, subsequently Colonel Copin, of the French Army, Headquarters, Beirut.

O.E.T.A. (East): Ali Riza Pasha el Rikaby, of the Arab Army, Headquarters, Damascus.

O.E.T.A. (North): Colonel Bremond, C.M.G., of the French Army, Headquarters, Adana.

In the administration of all these Areas I have been guided by the principles laid down in Sections VIII and IX of Chapter XIV (Laws and Usages of War on Land) of the Manual of Military Law, wherein my responsibilities as Military Occupant are defined. No departure from these principles has been permitted. Subject to the necessary modifications, the Turkish system of government and administrative machinery have been maintained in all areas. In O.E.T. (South), (West) and (East) the appointment of subordinate staffs was left to the discretion of the Chief Administrators, but in the case of O.E.T. (North) I instructed the Chief Administrator to carry out his functions through the medium of the Turkish officials, who were not to be dismissed without reference to me, nor were other Turkish subjects to be appointed as officials without my approval.

The co-ordination of administration between the different O.E.T.A.'s is carried out by a branch of my Headquarters Staff which has been strengthened for this purpose. A conference took place recently at which all Chief Administrators were present; and I propose, if necessary, to hold such conferences every three months. They will, in my opinion, do much to ensure mutual understanding and assistance between the several Administrations.

11. All these Administrations came into being under conditions of great complexity. The Turks during their retreat had destroyed or removed practically all records; large num-

bers of the population were in danger of starvation; commerce and industry had been disorganised by the war; and the complications of the currency question owing to the depreciation of Turkish money, especially Turkish notes, were very considerable. The Turks had, of course, collected the bulk of the taxes due for the current year in all the newly occupied areas; and it was not only impolitic but impracticable to attempt to collect any that might be outstanding there. I had, therefore, to accept the fact that these areas, must, for a time, be entirely dependent on Army funds; and that I must allot to each Chief Administrator a grant-in-aid, limited to what was absolutely necessary in order to continue administration.

I have not attempted to fix tariff rates for Turkish currency except in so far as the transactions of the Army and of the Military Administrations were concerned. In respect of these, it was necessary to fix rates on the basis of intrinsic value in order to protect public funds against loss. In the case of currency circulating among the inhabitants, I have not interfered with the exchange values fixed by the inhabitants for transactions amongst themselves. The situation as regards currency is still very difficult, and must remain so until the matter has been dealt with effectively by the Allied Powers.

12. The relief and repatriation of the large number of refugees of all nationalities has been a question of great difficulty; and it was found necessary to establish a Directorate to deal with the work. The duties of this Directorate are to co-ordinate, under the direct supervision of General Headquarters, the work of relief and repatriation in all areas, and for that purpose to maintain close touch with all such relief organisations as—

The American Red Cross.

The American Relief Commission for the Near East.

The Armenian-Syrian Relief Fund.

The Lord Mayor's (London) Fund.

The Union Nationale Armenienne.

The Syrian and Palestine Relief Commission.

The Palestine Zionist Committee.

Care is, of course, taken not to interfere in any way with the field of action of any Society in regard to the distribution of private funds or material resources. The Directorate is also responsible for the collection of all information regarding the number, location and circumstances of refugees; for the distribution of relief funds and the provision of food, clothing, medical assistance and transport, for the actual employment of refugees, where this is possible; and for the supervision of relief camps.

13. The task of maintaining order in Palestine and Syria during the period under review has been a delicate one. Though the attitude of the population towards the Allied Forces, who delivered them from Turkish domination, has been on the whole genuinely friendly, there are in these countries religious and racial differences between various sections of the population ready to blaze out at the least provocation. The state of tense expectation as to the political future of the country increases such feeling. All along the eastern borders are large numbers of Bedouin, supplied with arms and ammunition in greater quantities than ever before, who have never been subject to any but the most nominal control. They, too, are waiting to take advantage of any in-

ternal disorder as an opportunity for raids and plunder.

The only serious disturbance which has occurred was at Aleppo on February 22nd, when an anti-Armenian riot suddenly broke out. Prompt measures were taken by the troops to prevent it spreading, but about 40 Armenians were killed and 70 or 80 injured before order was restored. The outbreak appears to have been mainly a result of exaggerated reports of events in Cilicia causing a feeling of animosity against Armenians, which was probably skilfully fanned by C.U.P. Agents.

The rioters were punished and the town was made responsible for the payment of indemnities to the sufferers by the riot.

Formation of Army of Occupation.

14. By the end of 1918 I had moved to Egypt the Headquarters XXth Corps with the 10th, 53rd, 54th, 60th and 75th Divisions.

It was decided that the British forces in Palestine, Syria and Egypt, during the period of military occupation pending the decision of the Peace Conference with regard to Syria and Palestine, should consist of three Indian Divisions, two Indian Cavalry Divisions and a British Infantry Brigade, disposed as follows:—

Desert Mounted Corps (4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions) and 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions in Syria and Palestine.

One British Brigade in Egypt.

75th Division in Kantara area as a general reserve.

The necessary reorganisation of this force and the demobilisation of the other formations of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was proceeding, when the outbreak in Egypt occurred and changed the situation, necessitating the reformation of two more Divisions for the garrison of Egypt.

Part II.—General review of the Campaign.

14. The campaigns in Sinai, Palestine and Syria formed an important part of the general Allied effort against the Central Powers; and I propose to give here a brief summary of their relation to the operations in the main theatre on the Western Front, of their general features and results.

The forces employed in this theatre may be regarded in the nature of a detachment from the main forces on the Western Front; but engaged in the same great battle, changing its rôle and action according to the sway of events in the main theatre and the other minor theatres.

In the first instance, the object of this detachment was the protection of Egypt and the Suez Canal, a vital link in the communications of the Allies. By the summer of 1917, when I assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Lieut.-General Sir A. Murray's brilliant campaign in Sinai had removed the danger to Egypt, and had forced the enemy back across his own frontiers.

The original purpose of the detachment had been accomplished. But events elsewhere had given a fresh importance and another rôle to the operations in this theatre. The collapse of Russia had given a new lease of life to the Central Powers' weakest member, and had freed the main Turkish forces for action elsewhere. It was believed that they would be used in an offensive, planned and organised by

the Germans, for the recapture of Bagdad. It was therefore important to keep up the pressure on Turkey, and to anticipate the threatened attack on Bagdad by striking hard elsewhere.

The operations which commenced with the Gaza-Beersheba battle and led to the capture of Jerusalem and the freeing of all Southern Palestine, were therefore planned.

These operations had far-reaching results. The danger to Mesopotamia was removed; and it became possible to reduce the forces in that theatre. Instead of drawing fresh strength from the reserve of Turkish troops released by Russia's collapse, the Central Alliance found themselves compelled to send further support to their Eastern Ally; while a fresh impetus was given to the Arab struggle for freedom.

The moral results were even greater. Germany, hard put to it to hold her own in the close-locked struggle in the West, saw a great blow struck at her Eastern ambitions; while the capture of Jerusalem stirred the imagination of the Christian world.

15. The early months of 1918 were spent in consolidating the position in Palestine. The enemy was pushed back both in the hills and in the plain, until a strong line had been established, at a sufficient distance from Jerusalem and Jaffa, to allow of room for manœuvre in case of any attempt by the enemy to recover these places. The offensive rôle of the detachment was accomplished for the time being. The line secured could be held with the greatest possible economy of strength; and troops were thus freed for employment elsewhere, in accordance with the general strategical plan of the Allies.

Meanwhile the crisis of the war in the main theatre in the West was rapidly approaching. Under these circumstances it became essential to reduce detachments from the main theatre to a minimum; and, during April and May, two complete divisions, 24 other British battalions, 9 regiments of Yeomanry, 5 machine-gun companies and 5½ siege batteries were withdrawn for dispatch to France. They were gradually replaced by two Indian divisions from Mesopotamia, Indian Cavalry from France, and Indian battalions from India.

These were troops better suited by climatic conditions to this theatre than to the Western theatre. Further, the employment of Indian troops in theatres, where supplies from India did not have to pass through the submarine danger zone, simplified the shipping question.

Thus by the end of the summer the force was in a position to resume an offensive rôle and take part in the general series of Allied offensives which ended the war.

16. From the above short sketch it will be seen that the course of the campaigns in this theatre followed closely the course of events in the main Western theatre.

Thus the first period, the defence of the Canal, corresponded to the first check of the enemy's onrush in France and Belgium; the period of the advance through the Sinai desert, to the general development of the Allied strength and the building up of a secure battle line along the whole front; the 1917 advance, to the period of increased Allied pressure which exhausted the enemy's reserves; while the last advance coincided with the final Allied counter-offensive.

The operations in this theatre have thus been part of a studied whole, and not an isolated campaign.

17. Perhaps the most striking feature of the operations has been the variety of the terrain and of the nature of the fighting. There have been periods of desert warfare, of fighting in difficult hill country, and in open cultivated plain. There have been periods of trench warfare, alternating with periods of rapid movement with no fixed defences. Troops have been exposed to the sand and glare of the desert, to the tropical heat of the Jordan valley below the level of the sea, and to the bitter storms of the Judæan hills in winter.

Such conditions have called for great powers of endurance and cheerful adaptability on the part of the troops; of quick conception of the varying tactical circumstances on the part of all leaders; and of rapid organization and improvisation on the part of the staff. These qualities have never been lacking.

18. Though the percentage of casualties was lower than in the Western theatre, conditions of life were in many ways more onerous. To the majority of men, the weariness and discomforts of a prolonged war are worse than its dangers. Owing to shipping difficulties, the number of men who could be granted leave to their homes was very limited; and there were many who for 3 and 4 years had no opportunity of returning home. Owing to difficulties of communication, the provision of materials for the comfort and recreation of the troops could seldom be carried out on the same scale as in the theatres nearer home. The climate was trying and sometimes extremely unhealthy. That the health and morale of the men was maintained was due to their own inimitable spirit and willingness; to the constant care and foresight of the medical authorities; and to the organizations, official and private, which provided, in spite of all difficulties, for the comfort and recreation of the troops.

19. The experience gained in the varied forms of warfare which have fallen to the lot of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force has proved the soundness of the principles on which our army was trained before the war; and, above all, the value of the cavalry arm to confirm and exploit a success.

The new mechanical devices of war have played a less prominent part than in the Western theatre. The conditions of climate and ground were less favourable to the employment of tanks, or to the use of gas. The periods of trench warfare were comparatively brief, and the trench systems farther apart; consequently trench mortars and grenades had less value than in France. On the other hand, the increased importance, in modern warfare, of the machine gun was fully shown; and the superiority established by the air force over the enemy was one of the great factors of the successes of my troops.

Of the difficulties peculiar to this theatre, those of water and transport have been most prominent. The rivers and streams of Sinai, Palestine and Syria are, with few exceptions, dry in the summer; the roads fit for wheeled transport were, before the arrival of my army, very few. The developing of the underground supplies of water, the building of many miles of road, across hill, plain and desert, and the organization of the transport services has called for all the skill and resource of the Royal Engineers, constant foresight by the administrative services, and incessant hard work by every member of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

20. From Gaza to Aleppo the distance is some 500 miles, along the oldest highway in

the world. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force has followed in the path trod by many great armies of old; and has made history in a land full of history.

From a purely military point of view, the results of these campaigns may be summed up as follows:—The Turkish main army has twice been decisively defeated, on the second occasion with a completeness unparalleled in modern military history. Over 100,000 prisoners, over 500 guns, and the whole transport have been captured. These victories forced Turkey out of the war.

From the historical point of view, the land of Syria, Palestine and Arabia has been freed from the long Turkish domination, which has for centuries paralysed economical and political development. The railways and roads constructed in the course of our military operations open up great possibilities for the revival of the ancient prosperity of these countries.

Part III. Appreciation of Services.

21. I desire to express my indebtedness to my predecessor, Lieut.-General Sir A. J. Murray, who, by his bridging of the desert between Egypt and Palestine, laid the foundations for the subsequent advances of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. I reaped the fruits of his foresight and strategical imagination, which brought the waters of the Nile to the borders of Palestine, planned the skillful military operations by which the Turks were driven from strong positions in the desert over the frontier of Egypt, and carried a standard gauge railway to the gates of Gaza. The organization he created, both in Sinai and in Egypt, stood all tests and formed the cornerstone of my successes.

22. I am very grateful to General Sir C. Munro, Commander-in-Chief in India, for his untiring and unselfish assistance, by which my force was reconstituted with Indian troops in the summer of 1918, and was kept supplied with men and material at a time when his own difficulties in India and elsewhere were great. The Indian troops of my force worthily upheld the traditions of the Indian Army. Though many units were but newly formed, and a large proportion of the men but lately enlisted, they fought and marched like veterans. The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, which did such brilliant work in the defeat and pursuit of the enemy to Damascus and Aleppo, consisted mainly of Indian Troops. India has reason to be proud of the performances of her army in Palestine and Syria.

I take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the valuable services and high soldierly qualities of the following contingents of Indian Imperial Service Troops which, through the generosity of their respective Ruling Chiefs, were placed at my disposal:—

- Alwar Infantry.
- Bikanir Camel Corps
- Gwalior Infantry.
- Hyderabad Lancers.
- Jodhpur Lancers.
- Kashmir Infantry (two battalions).
- Kathiawar Signal Troop.
- Mysore Lancers.
- Patiala Infantry.
- Rutlam Despatch Riders.

23. From His Highness The Sultan of Egypt and his Government I have throughout received the most cordial support.

I have already recorded in my previous despatches the assistance I received at all times from His Excellency General Sir F. R. Wingate, High Commissioner for Egypt. I can only repeat here my thanks for his unflinching help and advice.

The Egyptian Army provided a number of units and numerous officers and men for service with the Expeditionary Force. These troops did excellent work and maintained a fine standard of smartness and discipline. My thanks are due to the Sirdar, Major-General Sir L. Stack, for the ungrudging spirit in which my requirements were met.

I have spoken previously of the work done by the Camel Transport Corps and Egyptian Labour Corps. The men of these Corps, by their cheerful work and staunchness under all conditions, have rendered possible the rapid advances of my troops, and have deserved the gratitude of the British Empire.

24. His Majesty The King of the Hedjaz has been a loyal ally, and has used his great personal influence in unswerving devotion to the cause of the Entente.

His Royal Highness The Emir Faisal, as Commander of the Arab forces, has shown himself a bold and skilful leader, and has always co-operated whole-heartedly with the other troops under my command. The daring exploits of the Arab Army contributed much to the final results of the campaign.

25. For the cordial support and co-operation of the Royal Navy I am indebted to Rear-Admiral T. Jackson and his successor, Rear-Admiral H. B. Pelly. My thanks are also due to Admiral Varney, commanding the French Naval Division of Syria, for the assistance given me by the French Navy. For the efficiency with which the naval transport service was carried out I desire to thank Commodore Unwin, my Principal Naval Transport Officer, and the naval transport staffs at the various bases.

26. For the successful execution of my plans I am indebted to my three Corps Commanders, Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel, commanding the Desert Mounted Corps, Lieut.-General Sir P. Chetwode, Bart., commanding the 20th Corps, and Lieut.-General Sir E. Bulfin, commanding the 21st Corps. To them my special thanks are due. The commanders of the Cavalry and Infantry Divisions in my force proved themselves bold and resourceful generals in a campaign of rapid movement.

Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel also acted as General Officer Commanding Australian Imperial Forces in Egypt; while Major-General Sir E. W. Chaytor acted as General Officer Commanding New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt. I take this opportunity of expressing my high appreciation of the services of these officers and of the Australian and New Zealand troops, which formed a large proportion of my force.

The contingent of French troops under Colonel de Piépape, and subsequently under General Hamelin, has well maintained the glorious traditions of the French Army; and I thank the two commanders mentioned above for their loyal and skilful execution of my orders.

The high efficiency with which the Italian Contingent has carried out the tasks which fell to its lot has been largely due to the personality

of Lieut.-Colonel d'Agostino and his successor Lieut.-Colonel Pesenti.

27. My Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Sir L. J. Bols, is an officer of the highest ability. I owe him a deep debt of gratitude for the consummate skill with which he has handled every problem.

He has been assisted by two general staff officers of great ability, Brigadier-General G. P. Dawnay, and, after General Dawnay's transfer to France, Brigadier-General W. H. Bartholomew. Since the departure of Brigadier-General Bartholomew, Brigadier-General J. A. W. Spencer, and then Brigadier-General A. P. Wavell, as Brigadier-General, General Staff have rendered service of the utmost value.

The intelligence branch has been ably conducted by Lieut.-Colonel W. V. Nugent and Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Deedes; and, subsequently, on reorganisation, by Brigadier-General B. T. Buckley.

The work of the Quartermaster-General's branch has been particularly onerous. Major-General Sir W. Campbell who has been Deputy-Quartermaster-General of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force since its formation, has shown unflinching resource in dealing with all the varying problems which have arisen. My sincere thanks are due to him; also to Brigadier-General E. F. O. Gascoigne and Brigadier-General E. Evans, who have understudied him and at various times have acted for him.

The work of the Adjutant-General's branch has been efficiently conducted by Major-General Sir J. Adye, and by Major-General Sir W. Western, who became my Deputy-Adjutant-General when the breakdown of Sir J. Adye's health necessitated his return to England. I wish also to refer to the good work performed in the Record Office at the Base by Brigadier-General C. P. Scudamore.

My Chief Political Officer, Brigadier-General Sir G. F. Clayton, by his sound judgment, tact and energy, has carried out his difficult task with great success. His French colleague, Monsieur G. Picot, has placed at my disposal his wide experience and local knowledge which have been of much value. Lieut.-Colonel De Méru has also done good work as liaison officer with the French authorities.

The organisation and direction of the artillery of the force has been ably carried out by Major-General Sir S. Smith.

The Engineer Services have had much hard and varied work to perform. This branch has been ably and successfully directed by Major-General H. B. H. Wright.

For the efficiency with which the Signal Service has been developed and maintained. I have to thank my Signal Officer-in-Chief, Brigadier-General Sir M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold.

The construction and organisation of the military railways has been a task of great importance. The knowledge and experience of Brigadier-General Sir G. Macauley, of the Egyptian State Railways, as my Director of Railway Transport, have been invaluable.

The Medical Services have dealt successfully with the difficulties of evacuation over long distances in a country of undeveloped com-

munications; and have combated with excellent results the chief scourge of Syria and Palestine, malaria. I desire to mention the good work of Major-General A. E. C. Keble and Major-General Sir R. H. Luce as Directors of Medical Services at various periods.

The work of the Military Secretary's branch has been ably performed by Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dalmeny; and, since his departure, by Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Andrew.

Of the other directors and heads of departments at General Headquarters, I wish to place on record the services of Brigadier-General G. F. Davies, my Director of Supplies and Transport; Brigadier-General P. A. Bainbridge, my Director of Ordnance Services; Brigadier-General Sir R. W. M. Jackson, my Director of Ordnance Services at the base; Brigadier-General E. M. Paul, my Director of Works; Brigadier-General Sir C. L. Bates, my Director of Remounts; Brigadier-General E. R. C. Butler, my Director of Veterinary Services; Brigadier-General R. C. Jellicoe, my Director of Labour; Colonel Warren, my Director of Army Postal Services; and Colonel Huggett, my Financial Adviser.

The Royal Army Chaplain's Department under the direction of Principal Chaplain, the Reverend A. V. C. Hordern, C.M.G., and after his departure in the spring of 1918, was succeeded by the Reverend E. R. Day, C.M.G., C.B.E., assisted by the chaplains of the different denominations administered to the spiritual necessities of the troops to my entire satisfaction.

Good work on the lines of communication and at the bases has been performed by Brigadier-General E. N. Broadbent, Commander of the Palestine Lines of Communication; Brigadier-General A. H. O. Lloyd, Commander of the Canal Zone; Major-General Sir H. D. Watson, Commanding Force in Egypt; and Brigadier-General R. Boyle, Commanding Alexandria District.

Lieut.-Colonel A. W. W. Simpson, as Inspector of Prisoners of War Camps, has dealt successfully with a difficult task.

28. I have in my previous despatches referred to the fine record of the Royal Air Force in Palestine and Syria. Amongst the many able officers who were responsible for its organization and command, I desire to mention Major-General Sir W. G. H. Salmond, Commanding Royal Air Force Middle East; and Brigadier-General A. E. Borton, who commanded the Palestine Brigade.

29. The difficult task of restoring administration in occupied enemy territory has been facilitated by the energy and ability of the Chief Administrators: Major-General Sir A. Money, Colonel de Piépape and his successor Colonel Copin, Colonel Brémond, and Ali Riza Pasha El Rikabi.

The gratitude of the inhabitants of the liberated territories is due to the various organizations, which undertook the relief of distress amongst that part of the population which the war had left homeless or destitute. I desire to mention particularly the work done by Colonel Finley of the American Red Cross, Doctor Weizmann of the Zionist Commission, and the Bishop of Jerusalem at the head of the Palestine and Syria Relief Fund; and to thank them and all those who worked under them.

My gratitude and that of the troops under my command is due to Mr. W. Jessop, General Secretary, and his colleagues of the Y.M.C.A. for their untiring efforts towards providing for the entertainment of and increasing the material comfort of the men.

Sir Alexander Baird, Bart., as President Arbitration Board, has by his unique know-

ledge of Egypt been able to settle differences and disputes to the satisfaction of all concerned.

I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

EDM. ALLENBY,

General, Commanding-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

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