

still further interfere with the continuity of long-range bombing.

By attacking as many centres as could be reached, the moral effect was first of all very much greater, as no town felt safe, and it necessitated continued and thorough defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different localities over which my force was operating.

At present the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1, and therefore it was necessary to create the greatest moral effect possible.

I also recommended, as you will recollect, that the proportion of day bombing squadrons in the Force should be slightly larger than that of night bombing squadrons, as I considered that, although day bombing squadrons suffer higher casualties than night bombing squadrons, at the same time, if day bombing is excluded, at least four-fifths of the value of night bombing must necessarily be wasted, owing to the fact that the enemy can then make his arrangements to work by day and live at a distance by night, and take many other similar defensive steps.

Also, if the bombing had been carried out exclusively by night it would not have caused the enemy to make such a large use of his men and material in defensive measures, and therefore it would not have affected the Western Front to such an extent as it did.

Though night bombing is the safer, many mistakes are made at night in reaching the locality it has been decided to bomb.

My Intelligence Department provided me with the most thorough information on all targets such as gas factories, aeroplane factories, engine factories, poison-gas factories, etc., each target having a complete detailed and illustrated plan, and maps were prepared of every target that was within reach. These were supplemented in a large way by the aerial photographs taken by reconnaissance machines.

Before it was possible to attack Germany successfully it was necessary to attack the enemy's aerodromes heavily in order to prevent his attacking our aerodromes by night, and by destroying his machines to render his attacks by day less efficacious. I considered that it was probable during the spring and early summer of 1919 that at least half my force would be attacking the enemy's aerodromes, whilst the other half carried out attacks on long-distance targets in Germany.

It was also necessary several times during the period the Force operated to carry out attacks in conjunction with the Armies on the enemy's communications.

I also had to decide, when it was impossible for squadrons to reach their objectives well in the interior of Germany, what alternative objective should be attacked, and which attacks would have the greatest effect in hastening the end of hostilities. I decided that railways were first in order of importance, and next in importance the blast furnaces.

The reason of my decision was that the Germans were extremely short of rolling stock, and also some of the main railways feeding the German Army in the West passed close to our front, and it was hoped that these communications could be seriously interfered with, and the rolling stock and trains carrying reinforcements or reliefs or munitions destroyed. They were also fairly easy to find at night.

I chose blast furnaces for the second alternative targets, as they were also easy to find at night, although it was difficult to do any really serious damage to them owing to the smallness of the vital part of the works.

On my arrival in the Nancy area the 8th Brigade consisted of those squadrons shown above. Additional squadrons arrived on the dates as shown:—

- No. 104 Squadron, De Hav. 9, B.H.P., 23rd May.
- No. 97 Squadron, Handley Page, Rolls Royce, 9th August.
- No. 215 Squadron, Handley Page, Rolls Royce, 19th August.
- No. 115 Squadron, Handley Page, Rolls Royce, 31st August.
- No. 110 Squadron, De Hav. 10, Liberty, 31st August.
- No. 45 Squadron, Sopwith Camel, 22nd Sept.

It must be remembered that new squadrons could not be used for work over the line until three weeks after their arrival, as during this period they were receiving their final training, which can only be carried out at the front.

No. 45 Squadron was intended to attack the enemy's scouts many miles over the line. It was necessary to re-equip this squadron with longer-range scouts after I received it, but as these machines did not arrive before the Armistice was signed the squadron was only used for attacking individual hostile machines which crossed our lines.

During August No. 100 Squadron, which was armed with F.E. 2b short-distance machines, commenced re-equipping with Handley Pages. While it was being re-equipped—which process took nearly the whole month—scarcely any work could be carried out by the squadron.

Below are a few interesting figures:—

The total weight of bombs dropped between the 6th June and the 10th November was 550 tons, of which 160 tons were dropped by day and 390 tons by night. Of this amount no less than 220½ tons were dropped on aerodromes. This large percentage was due to the necessity of preventing the enemy's bombing machines attacking our aerodromes and in order to destroy large numbers of the enemy's scouts on their aerodromes, as it was impracticable to deal with them on equal terms in the air. I think this large amount of bombing was thoroughly justified when it is taken into consideration that the enemy's attacks on our aerodromes were practically negligible, and not a single machine was destroyed by bombing during the period 5th June to 11th November.

In addition to this the following objectives were attacked:—

- Baalon.
- Baden.
- The Black Forest.
- Bonn.
- Cologne.
- Coblenz.
- Darmsdatt.
- Duren.
- Dillingen.
- Frankfurt.
- Forbach.
- Hagendengen.
- Heidelberg.
- Hagenau.
- Kaiserlautern.