

SUPPLEMENT

TO

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War Office, May 16, 1879.

A DESPATCH and its enclosures, of which the following are copies, have been received from the Lieut.-General Commanding in South Africa, by the Secretary of State for War:—

From the Lieut.-General Commanding in South Africa to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for War.

SIR, Durban, April 14, 1879.

I HAVE the honour, in continuance of my despatch, No. 13, forwarded by last mail, to forward the enclosures therein referred to, viz.:—

(a) The report of Brigadier-General Pearson, giving an account of his proceedings from the 24th January to 9th April.

(b) The report of Major Barrow, commanding the mounted portion of the relieving column on the 2nd April; together

(c) With some enclosures connected with number of horses killed or wounded, and arms taken from the enemy.

I am informed by my Deputy-Adjutant General that copies of every document received by him from Brigadier-General Wood connected with the events of 28th and 29th March have been forwarded to you; likewise that full particulars of all events since I crossed the border have been sent by telegraph, *vid* Madeira.

I had no opportunity of perusing these documents until my return to Durban on the 9th April, but I refrain from making any remarks on the events of those two days, as the reports will have been in your hands for some considerable time when this reaches you. I can, however, most fully endorse the terms in which Brigadier-General Wood has spoken of several officers under his command, knowing, as I do personally, the character of almost every officer referred to; but in the case of Mr. P. Uys, I had only known him from the letters, public and private, of those with whom he had been associated when serving Her Majesty. Colonel Wood and Colonel Buller had invariably spoken of him in the warmest terms, and his loss at such a time must, I consider, be considered a national one.

I trust that the brilliant success of the 29th March may be some consolation for the sad loss of life on the 28th. The full value of this success

and that of the 2nd April in the south-east of Zululand, is yet to be known, and I cannot but think these successes will most materially affect the whole course of politics in South Africa.

I have not observed in Colonel Wood's despatch any reference to the reason why he considered it desirable to attack on the 28th. I desire, therefore, to state that previous to advancing on Etshowe, I had given instructions along the whole line to make demonstrations against the enemy, for I had reason to believe at that time that I should find the whole Zulu army between my force and Etshowe.

I left Colonel Wood completely unfettered as to what action he should take in furthering this common object, but it is evident that the affair of the 28th was the result of his carrying out my wishes.

I have, &c.,
CHELMSFORD,
Lieutenant-General.

(A.)

From Colonel Pearson, Commanding No. 1 Column, to the Military Secretary, &c., &c., Durban.

Fort Tenedos, Lower Tugela Drift, Zululand,

SIR, April 9, 1879.

CIRCUMSTANCES, as you are aware, have prevented my continuing to acquaint you periodically with the proceedings of the column under my command, as directed by His Excellency the Lieutenant-General, Commanding. Since my despatch of the 23rd January, ultimo, when I reported my arrival at Ekowe and the action near the Inyazana River, in continuation of this correspondence, it will be remembered that my original orders were to entrench Ekowe, which was eventually to become an important Commissariat Depot, and to assist that department in every way in my power to equip it as speedily as possible.

I, accordingly, at once placed the question of the defences in the hands of Captain Wynne, R.E., the Senior Engineer officer, and on the morning of the 24th January I despatched 2 Companies 2nd Battalion, the Buffs, and 2 Companies Native Contingent, with a few mounted men, to meet a large convoy of commissariat wagons, under the orders of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Ely, 99th

Regiment, which had started from the Lower Tugela on the 22nd en route for Ekowe.

I also, on the morning of the 25th, sent back to the Tugela 48 empty wagons for further supplies under escort of 2 Companies 2nd Battalion, the Buffs, 2 Companies 99th Regiment, 2 Companies Native Contingent, and a few mounted men, the whole under command of Major Coates, 99th Regiment.

By the 27th January, the day on which we first heard of the disaster at Isandhlana by a telegram from Sir Bartle Frere (no details however being given), the entrenchments had made considerable progress, all available men having been employed on them.

Major Barrow with his mounted men had also reconnoitred towards the Umhlatosi River and Intumeni, the Norwegian Mission Station, some 12 miles N.W. of us, which was to be the immediate destination of the 2nd Column.

About 9 A.M. on the 28th January, I received by special messenger a telegram from Lord Chelmsford, confirming the news sent me by Sir Bartle Frere. His Lordship was pleased to give me full liberty to act as I thought best in the interests of my column under the circumstances, and sanctioned my retiring, if I thought fit, either to some position nearer the Tugela, or even to the left bank of that river. I was to be prepared, however, if I held my position at Ekowe, to have the whole Zulu army down on me.

I at once assembled all my Staff and Company Officers and laid the position of affairs before them, and requested them to give me their opinions unreservedly. Some were for retiring, whilst others most strongly opposed any retrograde movement.

Personally I was in favour of retiring at first, as I believed, until further reinforcements could arrive from home, that the presence of every available soldier would be necessary in Natal to protect the colony from wholesale raids by the Zulus; but, on further reflection, I judged that if we continued to hold our forward position in the country—nearly 40 miles from the frontier—it might have a good moral effect and even afford protection to that part of the colony immediately behind us; at any rate we should be keeping a certain force of the enemy watching us, which could not therefore be available elsewhere.

Having satisfied myself that we were sufficiently supplied with ammunition for our present wants, it was finally decided to remain at Ekowe, and to fortify ourselves as strongly as possible.

The question of our food supply had of course been duly considered. The troops had started with 15 days' provisions, and most fortunately Colonel Ely's Column was now in sight, about 7 miles distant. I lost no time in acquainting that officer with the state of affairs, and I sent him several extra spans of oxen to help his wagons over the hilly road before him. Such was the state of the roads, however, after the constant rain which had fallen during many weeks past, that, notwithstanding the additional assistance, the last of Colonel Ely's wagons did not arrive until 12 o'clock that night, and he had to abandon eight. I sent oxen to bring them on the following morning, but meantime the contents had been looted by the Zulus.

In order still further to increase our food supply, and to add to the defensive power of the colony, I had already decided on sending back the whole of the mounted troops attached to my column, together with the remaining companies of the 2 Battalions Native Contingent. These troops left Ekowe about noon on the 28th, with wagons of course, and, as we afterwards learnt,

reached the Lower Tugela that night by cross country paths.

Our next care was to laager some of the wagons along the parapets in such a manner as to protect the men from the reverse and inflade fire to which in many places they would be exposed; all the other wagons were afterwards formed into a laager for the oxen under the fire of the Fort.

Pending the result of the stock taking of our food supply, which I had ordered, I now placed the garrison upon a reduced bread and grocery ration; but as a large number of slaughter cattle had been driven up with Colonel Ely's convoy, I increased the meat ration by $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.

Having reason to believe that the troops whom I had sent away had brought a certain quantity of private supplies with them, I had their wagons officially searched, and a quantity of food, medicines, and medical comforts were thus added to our stock, the two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value to us.

All articles of luxury, tobacco, matches, &c., I caused to be handed over to the Commissariat Department to be dealt with as I might afterwards determine; they were eventually sold by auction and fetched fabulous prices—matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles for 15s., tobacco for 30s. per lb., in fact about £7 worth of things realized upwards of £100.

When I received the Commissariat report about our food, I found that we could not safely calculate upon our supplies lasting beyond the latter end of March, it having been found advisable, owing to the discovery of a large quantity of rotten biscuit and flour, to make a large deduction—10 per cent—in anticipation.

Fortunately the loss of these articles never reached this amount, and not only, as time went on, did we find our supplies holding out far better than we ever expected, but I felt enabled for a time to comply with the recommendation of my Senior Medical Officer to increase the bread ration if only temporarily. I did so for about ten days, and yet, nevertheless, such was the care exercised by the Commissariat Department to avoid waste, that with the reduced ration on which the troops were again placed, we should have been able to hold out till 10th April; a few things only, sugar, pepper, and preserved vegetables having run out.

With medicines we were not so fortunate, and long before we were relieved many of those most required were exhausted.

Our defences meantime were being perfected, and long before the end of February we were quite secure, and I feel sure could have repelled an attack by any number of Zulus.

For the description of Fort Ekowe I beg to refer to the paper by Captain Courtney, R.E., attached to this letter. Our sanitary arrangements were placed in the hands of the Quartermaster of the Buffs, and 99th Regiment. The former looked after the interior and the latter the exterior of the Fort and its immediate surroundings.

The water supply was fortunately excellent both in quality and quantity. The upper part of the stream gave us an abundant supply of drinking and cooking water, and along the lower portion of it Quartermaster Bateman, 99th Regiment, constructed excellent bathing places both for officers and men, which I am convinced contributed in no small degree to the preservation of our health.

The horses and cattle were watered in a separate stream.

An Infantry water picquet, assisted by a

mounted patrol, was posted daily between reveille and retreat, when everyone had to retire within the Fort to prevent any evasion of the orders relative to our water supply, no cattle, horses or cooking (which was all done outside the Fort), being permitted near the stream upon any pretence.

Each Quartermaster had a large fatigue party placed at his disposal daily, and the following routine was invariably adopted.

At reveille the urine barrels which had been provided for the use of the men during the night were carried out of the Fort and emptied into trenches dug the night before at some distance off, and which were filled in at once as soon as this duty was performed.

The places where those barrels had stood in the Fort were then sprinkled with ashes from the kitchens, and afterwards with clean sand, the ashes having been first removed.

The fatigue parties next proceeded to clean up all dirt and litter both inside and outside the fort, and cart it away to the offal pits, the contents of which were buried as far as possible before they were filled up.

The hospital patients were removed daily—those, at least, who could bear removal—to a shelter constructed of boughs of trees, on an eminence near the fort. This arrangement gave them abundance of fresh air, the hospital itself got purified, and the cleaning could be done more effectually.

I have purposely entered into detail in this matter, as I am naturally anxious to prove that no precautions were neglected to keep the fort and its vicinity in as sanitary a condition as possible.

At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased, and when we were relieved on the 4th April there were 9 officers and nearly 100 men on the sick list. Some of them are still seriously ill, and 4 deaths have occurred since we left Ekowe. We buried there 4 officers and 21 C. K. P. men.

The chief disorders were diarrhoea, dysentery, common, continued, and typhoid fever; no doubt much of the sickness was attributable to the constant wet weather, and the overcrowding in the fort, the work having been constructed for a much smaller garrison.

The large percentage of deaths were probably due to the want of proper medicines and medical comforts. A state showing the strength of the garrison is herewith attached.

As regards shelter, there was only room in the fort for a very few tents in addition to those required for hospital purposes, and both officers and men lived under the wagons, over which the wagon sails were spread, propped up with tent poles: thus the wagons being all round the parapets, as I have already described, the troops actually lived at their alarm posts, and could be on the banquettes in a few seconds.

The buildings of the Mission Station were handed over to the Commissariat, and just sufficed to store our supply of food.

The church was used as the hospital. By day the picquet duties were performed by a small vedette corps, formed by a few men of the Mounted Infantry and Natal Volunteers, and organized by Lieut. Rowdon, 99th Regiment, and Captain Sherrington, Native Contingent.

I cannot speak too highly of the careful and zealous way in which this responsible duty was done, and which I consider reflects much credit on the officers above named, as well as those under their command. These vedettes were constantly under fire; one was killed at his post;

another, Private Carson, 99th Regiment, was attacked by about a dozen Zulus, who crept up near him in the long grass. They shot off two fingers of his right hand; he had a bullet through each thigh, and another in his right arm. His horse was also assegaied. He nevertheless got away, retained his rifle, and rode back to the ort. At night or in foggy weather the outposts were withdrawn, and each company furnished a guard with two or more sentries. Natives were also distributed along the parapets, their eyesight being so good.

As regards the oxen, we had several hundred head, besides a number of mules and horses. On our first arrival at Ekowe, there was an abundance of grass close to the Fort, but it soon got eaten down, and the cattle had to be driven further off, till at last there was nothing for them to eat nearer than between 2 and 3 miles distant.

This, of course, necessitated strong guards, and the greatest care and vigilance had to be exercised by the Transport Officer to prevent their straying and getting captured.

The cattle was my chief source of anxiety, more especially latterly, when they had to go so far for their grass. No attack, however, was ever made upon them by the Zulus, who contented themselves with firing upon them from long distances, much too far generally to cause any damage.

Very soon after our arrival at Ekowe we found ourselves being gradually cut off from all communication with Natal, though occasionally a native messenger was persuaded to run the gauntlet through the enemy.

Between 11th February and 2nd March we had no communication whatever with the Lower Tugela, but on the morning of that day we had the happiness to see signals flashed to us from that neighbourhood.

At first we were unable to reply, but Captain Macgregor, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, whom I placed in charge of the signalling arrangements, soon got an improvised heliograph constructed, and when the weather permitted we were able to communicate with Natal daily.

Our information regarding the movements of the Zulus was absolutely nil, and so many men being daily employed on the entrenchments and cattle guards, besides having but a very few mounted men and scarcely any natives, I consider it only prudent to remain on the defensive, and therefore, with the exception of burning all the kraals in our immediate neighbourhood, and sometimes sending foraging parties to the nearest mealie and pumpkin gardens, we confined our attention almost entirely to strengthening the fort and guarding our numerous cattle.

The Chief Dabulamanzi—a half-brother to Cetawayo—had a military kraal near Ekowe, which I thought it would be desirable to destroy, but it being 7 miles distant and unapproachable, except over country more or less covered with bush, I considered it would not be right to attempt it, except with a comparatively large force. Accordingly, on the 1st March, I started at 2 A.M. with 450 men and 1 gun Royal Artillery, and reached the vicinity of the kraal a little before daylight. The Zulus were completely surprised, and if we had only possessed a good body of horsemen we would no doubt have killed or taken prisoners a great number. As it was, they ran off to the neighbouring hills, and I fear we did them but little damage. The military kraal consisting of upwards of 50 huts were, however, completely destroyed, besides 3 others which we burnt on our way back. Returning,

we were followed by the enemy, but at a long distance and in no great numbers, which satisfied me that at any rate in that immediate neighbourhood the Zulus were not at that time in any force. Our casualties were nil, but, as far as I could observe, we killed or wounded about a dozen of the enemy. We knew from the messages flashed to us, that a force was being collected for our relief, and it was evident that the Zulus had either got news of it or that they imagined our food could not hold out much longer, for we could see numerous fires—daily increasing—in the Inyazane Valley; evidence of the presence of a large force in that neighbourhood. The vedettes, too, were constantly seeing large bodies of Zulus filing down the distant hills towards the Inyazane, where they were evidently collecting either to intercept our relief or retreat.

To make a new road from Ekowe to the nearest point of the regular road from the Inyazane, so as to avoid a long detour of over 7 miles, had long been contemplated. It was surveyed early in March and commenced on the 7th. The road was made practicable within a week, but owing to the heavy rains which fell in March, it became too soft in places for heavy traffic. In winter, however, it would have been an excellent road.

Either the working or covering parties were nearly always under fire, though fortunately we had only one casualty; Lieutenant Lewis, the Buffs, wounded in the head. This new road is fully described by Captain Courtney.

Most unaccountably no attempt was ever made at night to capture the cattle or to annoy us inside the Fort. Had it been otherwise, the men would have been so harassed from want of sleep that the works would have been very materially delayed, and no doubt, our sick list would have been largely increased. We had a few "scares" during the night, as might be expected, but in every instance they proved to be false alarms.

The alacrity, however, with which the parapets were variously manned satisfied me that the garrison was already fully on the alert. On the 3rd April we were still hard at work improving the defences when we received intelligence that Lord Chelmsford intended to evacuate Ekowe, and to establish a fortified post on the coast road instead. The works still in contemplation were described in a paper, prepared for the new garrison (had we been replaced as at first intended), by Captain Courtney, so there would have been no check or interruption in going on with them.

Captain Macgregor had also made a ground plan (enclosed) of the Fort and its immediate vicinity for the information and guidance of our successors.

On evacuating Ekowe, I am happy to be able to report that, with the assistance of some spans of oxen sent me by His Excellency the Lieutenant-General from his camp (we had lost many by death, and had long since commenced to eat the trek oxen), I brought away every wagon and all stores which were of the slightest use. My march to the Tugela was performed without any interruption from the enemy. At one of my camps on the way down, between the Inyazane and Amatakulu Rivers, and about 5 miles from the Head Quarters laager, several dead bodies of Zulus were found, showing, I think, that the number killed in the attack on Lord Chelmsford was under estimated in the official accounts, as no doubt many other bodies were lying about in other directions equally distant from the laager.

It now only remains for me to bring to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Lieutenant-General the names of those officers who, from the positions they held, came under my personal observation; and this I find a task of some difficulty, for I am proud to state, that without exception, no officer, non-commissioned officer or private behaved otherwise than with credit to the British Army. From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear cheerfully. The Officers of my Staff, Colonel Walker, C.B., Scots Guards, Captain Macgregor, 29th Regiment, and Lieutenant Knight, the "Buffs," my orderly officer, were indefatigable, and gave me every support, and much valuable advice, Captain Macgregor's position perhaps, as Deputy Adjutant Quartermaster-General, was the most prominent, and I have to thank him for the deep interest he took in all sanitary questions and reconnoissance duty. A sketch by him of the Fort and its neighbourhood is enclosed, but I trust the intelligence department in which he has served will ere long have the benefit of the report which he is compiling from his official journal.

The several Commanding Officers, Commander Campbell, Royal Navy, Lieutenant Lloyd, Royal Artillery, Captain Wynne, Royal Engineers, Lieut.-Colonel Parnell, the "Buffs," and Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, with their officers, are entitled to full credit for the good discipline and cheerful spirit of their men.

The Royal Engineers, of course, took a very prominent part in the construction at Fort Ekowe. Captain Courtney's paper will show all that was accomplished under their able guidance. Captain Wynne's illness is much to be deplored. I consider him a most valuable officer, and his illness is entirely due to over exertion at a time when he was in very indifferent health. I much fear he is dying. Of Captain Courtney, his successor, I entertain a very high opinion, and it gives me much pleasure to endorse the favourable opinion expressed by him of his subalterns, Lieutenants Main and Willock, attached to the Royal Engineers. I had a small corps of Native Pioneers who, and their excellent officers Captain Beddoes and Lieutenant Paringdon, did much valuable service. These two officers managed their men extremely well, and gave proof that, properly officered, the Natal Kafirs are capable of being made into excellent soldiers.

The Medical Department was under the orders of Staff Surgeon Morbury, Royal Navy, and though he had many and great difficulties to contend with, he did his utmost to mitigate the discomforts to which the sick were exposed, and most carefully watched over the sanitary condition of the Fort.

The Medical Officer acting under Dr. Morbury gave him every support. The Transport Branch of the Commissariat Department was superintended by Captain Pelley Clark and Lieutenant Thirkill, 88th Regiment. Both are able and hard working officers, and assisted by their conductors did their utmost to look after the valuable property in their charge. I am very sorry to say that both these officers have returned in very indifferent health.

The Commissariat Department was most satisfactorily worked by Assistant Commissary Heygate, until he became too ill to continue at his duty, a short time before the evacuation of the Fort. Attached to the Commissariat Department as issuer was Sergeant-Major Wishart

90th Light Infantry, one of the hardest working and most deserving non-commissioned officers I have ever met with.

Connected with the vedette duties, I wish to mention a circumstance which I think reflects great credit upon Captain Sherrington, Native Contingent, and the undermentioned men, viz. :— Corporal Adams, Native Contingent, Privates Whale, Robson, Higley and Keys, 99th Regiment, and Trooper Garlands, Victoria Mounted Rifles.

The vedettes, shortly after our arrival at Ekowe, were daily annoyed when they patrolled in the morning, before finally taking up their posts, by the fire of a party of Zulus from a high hill. It was believed that this party took up their position very early in the morning, and Captain Sherrington and the above party volunteered to go out at night and lie in wait for them behind some rocks near the top of the hill, being utterly ignorant, however, of the number of the Zulus.

I consented, and this little expedition resulted in 3 Zulus being wounded (though not so seriously as to prevent them making good their escape), and the vedettes never being annoyed from this hill again.

In fact, no Zulu was ever afterwards seen there. I must not conclude this letter without publicly acknowledging the devotion to their duties of the Reverends R. Robertson and A. Walsh, Church of England and Roman Catholic Chaplains, respectively. The former was also my political assistant, and I owe him many thanks for his valuable advice and information upon all subjects connected with Zululand.

I have, &c.

C. K. PEARSON, Colonel,
Commanding No. 1 Column.

Report on Fort Ekowe.

THE following report is drawn up from the diary of Captain Wynne, R.E., commanding 2nd Company Royal Engineers. This diary closes on the 11th March, 1879, since which date Captain Wynne has been on the sick list; from the 11th March to the 4th April Captain Courtney, R.E., continued the diary :—

No. 1 Column, under command of Colonel Pearson, reached Ekowe about noon on the 23rd January, 1879.

Ekowe lies about 1½ miles off the main road from Tugela to Ulundi. It is a Norwegian Mission Station, but has been abandoned for several months. There are three thatched buildings, built of brick and plastered, one a dwelling-house with verandah and several small rooms (on plan X).

One a school-room (marked Y on plan), and a third containing a workshop and stores (Z on plan).

There is also a church built of the same materials but with a corrugated iron roof with a vestry at the east end (Q on plan). An open shed lay to the north of these buildings but was destroyed during the construction of the fort; a small out-house to the north of the dwelling-house (W on plan) was worked into the parapet at the north-east angle of the fort (on plan). These buildings lie within a space 120 yards by 80 yards, on ground sloping from west to east, the church being on the higher ground, and the dwelling-house, with a good garden of orange trees on the lower part of the slope, at the bottom of which was a stream of good water well supplied by springs from all sides.

This stream runs in a south-east direction, and

is met by another small watercourse on the south side of the station.

On the rising ground beyond the junction of these two streams stood a dwelling-house with a garden of orange trees, &c., and on the south side of the watercourse stood another smaller house.

There was also a dwelling-house on the high ground to the south-west of the fort and about 250 yards distant; these three last-mentioned houses were all demolished and the materials utilized in the construction of the fort.

The valleys of the streams and the neighbouring kloofs were wooded and thickly grown with under-wood.

The station stands high as regards the neighbouring country generally (about 2,000 feet above the sea) but is commanded by hills from 400 to 1,200 yards distant on the north and south sides.

To the west of the church at a distance of 70 yards, the ground falls suddenly and forms a deep kloof, the sides of which were covered with bush. The approach by the branch from the Tugela road is along a narrow ridge running a short distance from north-west to south-east, past the station; otherwise the ground falls away from the station on all sides.

This station was selected as a dépôt for stores for the supply of No. 1 Column, and also of the others after concentration on Ulundi. It was chosen (from description only) on account of its position as regards distance from the Lower Tugela, the ample supply of water and the healthiness of the site, but chiefly because of the existence of buildings ready for occupation as storehouses.

When the position was examined after the arrival of the Column, it was pointed out that in itself it was weak and subject to great disadvantages in a military point of view, and that had materials been brought for the erection of a store, it would have been far preferable to have selected the more open and commanding ground to the north of the station.

As, however, shelter for the stores was required without delay, and there was no good material immediately available for building, it was decided to include the station buildings within the area of the fort, and minimise the defects by constructing traverses and parados.

The work of clearing the ground was commenced on the afternoon of the 23rd instant, and continued for a considerable time afterwards, as it was not possible to burn the bush, and all had therefore to be cut down.

It was proposed to leave a garrison of 400 men with two guns. The trace decided on had a perimeter of 450 yards, which was undoubtedly too great, but it was impossible to reduce it, and at the same time include the buildings, without entirely neglecting military considerations. As it was, the west face was too retired to command the nearest slope of the deep kloof on that side, and the valley of the stream on the north side was not thoroughly exposed to fire.

The plan accompanying this report shows the trace adopted, also the profiles of the parapets and ditches. The general relief of the work was 6 feet, but at the re-entering angle on the north face it was increased to 8 feet 6 inches, running to 7 feet at the north-east angle and to 6 feet at the north-west angle. At the south-east angle a stockade was constructed 17 feet high, with a double tie of loopholes, so that the undefended ground on the valley to the south could be searched by a few marksmen.

Work was commenced on the 25th January,

1879, the Engineers and Natal Pioneers working eight hours, the Infantry and Naval Brigade six hours, and the Native Contingent eight hours; the latter were only employed in clearing the ground.

The strength of the parties were—Royal Engineers, 50; Pioneers, 40; Infantry, 140; and Natives, 250.

On Sunday, the 26th instant, the working hours were reduced for the day, excavation of ditches and hurdle revetting being the work in hand.

Similar work was continued till mid-day on the 28th instant, when, in consequence of the receipt of adverse news from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, it was decided to occupy the fort at once, and withdraw the troops from their encampments into the fort. The work was pressed on as much as possible, but the immediate occupation of course delayed the completion of the revetments, slopes, &c.; and as several alarms occurred during the following days, involving cessation of work, and the use of temporary expedients, such as tents, blankets, &c., for completing the parapets for immediate use, the time taken in constructing the work was necessarily much greater than it would otherwise have been. Wagons loaded with provisions and other stores were used to form (*sic*), and as soon as possible the provisions were removed to store, and the sacks filled with earth and replaced on the wagons. Nearly all these wagons remained in their positions till the evacuation of the fort, and do not appear to have been injured in any way. Shelter for the troops was formed under and in front of the wagons, by stretching out the tarpaulins, and also by throwing spare tarpaulins over frameworks of poles, &c.

The church was loopholed, and a gallery formed for the defenders so as to interfere as little as possible with the use of the floor space for hospital patients. Platforms were made for four guns and one Gatling gun, as shown on the plan; blindages of sand bags resting on frames of timber being provided for the protection of the gunners.

The greatest difficulty lay in providing for the permanent protection of the large number of wagons and oxen which the severed communication with Tugela left on our hands. At first the oxen were driven into the ditches and into a laager of wagons formed in the shape of a ravelin on the south face; they escaped, however, from the ditches unless constantly watched, and the wagon laager screened so much of the direct fire of the south face that it was subsequently abandoned and reformed in the deep kloof at the west side of the fort, so that the fire from that face was not marked. Here, however, the slopes were too steep to allow good standing ground for all the oxen, and after a few days' experience about half the cattle were removed from the laager and tethered at night on the south glacis. In the middle of March the laager in the kloof was abandoned, and two circular laagers formed on the reverse slopes of the valley on the south side of the fort. It will thus be seen that the presence of so many cattle, which was not contemplated when the fort was traced, was really the chief difficulty to be considered in arranging for the defence of the fort. The horses were picketed in the ditch of the north face.

Three bridges were provided. One at the main gate was a rolling bridge with a wagon roadway. This bridge was run in every night, and though subject to very heavy traffic, no difficulty ever occurred in working it. It was designed and erected by Lieutenant Main, R.E.

A drawbridge for foot passengers was provided at the north-east angle, as this was the shortest way from the fort to the water. It was called the water gate. A temporary bridge was constructed near the stockade to facilitate access to the cookhouses, &c.; on the glacis the parapet was crossed by steps, and no opening made here.

The flank defence of the south and west faces was effected by constructing the caponiers shown on the plan, that of the north face by constructing indents near the re-entering angle where the prolongation of the escarp cut the crest of the adjoining parapet.

The stockade flanked the south-east ditch, and the north-east ditch was left unflanked, also parts of the stockade ditch; the greater portion of these undefended ditches was staked, so as to render a rush more difficult.

Trou de loups were formed on the east faces and wire entanglements on parts of the south and north faces.

The drainage from the fort was carried into the ditch by openings left at the eastern salient and stockade, these being the two lowest points; from the ditch the water was carried into the stream on the south side by a large drain, eleven feet deep at the counterscarp; the glacis was made good over the upper portion of this drain.

There was a great deal of heavy rain, and the main openings were amply large enough for carrying off all the water, but there was room for a great deal of improvement in the many small drains which existed in the fort.

There was no foul drainage to provide for, as urine tubs and metal earth-closets were used by night, and by day the latrines, &c., outside the fort were alone allowed to be used.

All refuse within the fort was removed every morning and buried outside.

The nature of the surface soil (about four feet of vegetable mould) rendered communications and paths about the fort very disagreeable in wet weather. A gravel pathway was made near the water gate, and the road through the centre of the fort to the main gate was in course of being macadamized. The stone could only be obtained in large blocks, and a good deal of labour was required in breaking it.

The question of hutting the troops was considered as soon as the defences were considered complete, and at the end of February a hut 33 feet long and 20 feet wide was commenced near the south-east angle; this hut was only just finished in the beginning of April, when it was decided to use it only for stores. The design at first provided for a traverse in the centre constructed of wattles filled in with earth, but this was found impracticable and abandoned. The slow progress of this work was due to the difficulty experienced in getting straight timber for the frame work and roof, to the wet weather and to the pressure of other works; the walls and roof were formed of timber with hurdles between the uprights, and a hurdle roof, the whole plastered with a mixture of cow-dung, clay, and grass. Later on, a hut of simpler construction was erected near the main gate, omitting the earth traverse; the roof was formed by stretching a tarpaulin over the rafters, and the sides were not daubed. This hut was occupied for a few days and appeared to answer well. The difficulty experienced in obtaining suitable timber showed that huts could not be constructed in a reasonable time, and it was decided to use tents, and to construct parados of timber in short lengths, the waggons being removed as the parados were finished.

This work was commenced, but the evacuation

of the fort put a stop to it. As the hurdle revetments decayed, sod revetments were substituted for them, and sod traverses for the traverses of sacks and wagons; this work was nearly completed when the evacuation was ordered.

The supply of water was obtained entirely by carrying water from the stream; a constant reserve supply was kept up by filling all the available vessels in the fort, and the water in them was constantly changed. Wagons lined with tarpaulins were also used at first for keeping water in, but the supply was not maintained, as the oil in the tarpaulins gave the water an unpleasant taste; they would however, have been most valuable if filled immediately before any emergency arose. Gutters were provided to catch the rain water from the church roof; the water from the roofs of the other buildings (which were plastered with mud to reduce the risk of fire) was not collected. During the excavation of the ditch several springs were found, and a well 25 feet deep was sunk on the glacis of the north face, but the supply was found insufficient to be of much use, and the risk of surface contamination was considered too great, so the work was abandoned and the well closed in. There was also a good spring in the south ditch, and had there been any necessity for it this supply could have been utilized.

Captain Wynne, R.E., commenced a regular trigonometrical survey of the whole position. The triangulation was completed and plotted and the contouring commenced when his illness put a stop to the work.

A range table was prepared by Captain Wynne, and the positions marked on the ground; the triangulation also served as the basis for the military sketch of the ground made by the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

On the 5th March it was determined to reconnoitre the country between the fort and a point on the existing Tugela road, about 6 miles from the fort, with a view of constructing a more direct road. The route was considered practicable; it involved the construction of three drifts or fords and several side cuttings on the hills. Strong working parties were employed on this work, and it was considered fit for use on the 13th March when the surplus garrison was to have retired to Tugela. After that date further improvements were made, and this road would have proved most useful, as it saved 3 miles in distance; but the heavy rains at the end of March and on the 1st April damaged parts of it so much that it was not considered advisable to use it when the garrison evacuated the fort on the 4th April. It was used, however, by the relieving force, both in advancing and retiring, on the 3rd and 5th April. The execution of the work was several times opposed by the enemy, and the working parties were under fire.

On the 2nd March flashing signals were observed at the Tugela, and endeavours, which ultimately proved successful, were made to open communication. Captain Wynne constructed a large screen, working on horizontal pivots, and erected it on the high ground to the north of the fort. The signalmen at Tugela, however, failed to see it, and a looking-glass on a horizontal hinge with a vertical pivot was successfully used.

The signalling was entirely under the direction of the Assistant Quartermaster-General at Ekowe. Lieutenant Haynes, R.E., initiated the signalling at Tugela, the valuable results of which cannot be over estimated. The fort was evacuated but not destroyed on the 4th April. All useful tools,

materials, &c., were removed as far as possible, and unserviceable tools and metal work buried.

In conclusion, although the fort at Ekowe was open to many objections, both as regards position and some points of construction and trace, there can be no doubt that it would have been sufficiently strong to check any force brought against it by the enemy, so long as the supply of ammunition lasted. Had there, however, been any activity shown by him in annoying the garrison by occasional firing into the fort at night, it would have been impossible to have avoided sending out picquets and constructing outworks and rifle pits in advance; the disadvantages of the site would then have been keenly felt, and the troops would have been much harassed. It is therefore to be hoped that in future operations full latitude in the selection of the site may be left to those charged with the construction of the work.

It is very much to be regretted that Captain Wynne's illness has prevented him from writing this report, which in his hands would have been much more complete, but there can be no doubt that he would have wished to bring to your notice the services of Lieutenant Main, R.E., who joined the company at Tugela, and took charge of the Natal Pioneers on the road to Ekowe, when he executed many useful repairs to the road in advance of the column. His previous experience of South African wars, and knowledge of the materials available for use, has been most invaluable at Ekowe, where many of the works involving extra care and skill were designed and carried out by him. Lieutenant Willock, R.E., has also rendered valuable service; it is to be regretted that he also is on the sick list, having fallen ill on the 19th March. The sketch annexed to this report is copied chiefly from his drawings and those of Lieutenant Main's, and his sketch of the new road has, I think, been incorporated in the Assistant Quartermaster-General's sketch of the ground near Ekowe.

D. C. COURTNEY, Capt. R.E.

April 9, 1879.

(B)

Staff Office, Head Quarters.


I HAVE the honour to furnish the following report relative to the part taken by the mounted troops in the action at the Gingindhlovo on the 2nd instant. At 6 a.m. Captain Nourse reported that some of Thausie's mounted scouts had seen the Zulus crossing the Inyezana, and almost immediately afterwards the attack commenced. I directed the mounted troops to saddle up and stand to their horses for dismounted duty, one man holding four horses, leaving three-quarters in reserve for use in the trenches if required. At 6.40 a.m. I advanced out of the laager by the front face with the Volunteers and mounted Infantry, and opened fire on the enemy who had retired into the long grass out of fire from the laager.

At 7 a.m. the rear face of the laager was attacked in force, and I took half squadron of mounted Infantry to observe the movement.

Captain Cook's troop of Natal Horse, also two squadrons of mounted Natives then advanced out of the laager by the right face.

The enemy then retired to the low ground below the rear face, and the Natal Horse brought an effective flank fire on them, assisting in causing the Zulus to break.

The dispositions of the mounted troops at this period were as follows:—



1. Half squadron mounted Infantry, Lieutenant Sugden.
2. Volunteer squadron.
3. Half squadron mounted Infantry, Lieutenant Rawlins.
4. Natal Horse Troop.
5. Mafunzi's Natal Horse.
6. Thausie's Natal Horse.

At about 7.15 a.m. the Zulus retired from the rear face and the Natal Native Contingent advanced out of the laager. At the same time, accompanied by Lieut. Courtney, I succeeded in making a flank attack on the retreating Zulus with half a squadron mounted Infantry under Lieut. Rawlins, who led his squadron with considerable dash and to my entire satisfaction.

The half squadron drew swords and charged the Zulus, who were in large numbers, but utterly demoralized. The actual number of men killed with the sword were probably few, but the moral effect on the retreating Zulus as the swordsmen closed in on them was very great. In most cases they threw themselves down and showed no fight, and were assegaied by the Natal Native Contingent who were following up. A few Zulus showed fight and assegaied one or two horses, but the majority did not do so.

The half squadron then rallied and followed up again up to a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from camp, when it was at last checked by a spruit.

The Natal Horse followed up in support, but were unfortunately unable to charge owing to having no arm blanche or revolver. They fired however with effect.

I have no hesitation in saying, that had a regiment of English Cavalry been on the field on this occasion scarcely a Zulu would have escaped to the Umisi Hill.

The half squadron mounted Infantry, under Lieut. Sugden, and the Volunteer squadron endeavoured to follow up on the front face, but were unable to close on enemy on account of the boggy ground and the fire of the Natal Native Contingent.

The mounted Natives followed the enemy for some miles towards the Gingindhlovo Kraal and Amatakulu, and Thausie's squadron succeeded in recapturing some 15 head of cattle, which the Zulus had found outside the laager.

I think that credit is due to these Native mounted squadrons for advancing out of the laager by the right face when the main attack of the Zulus was being made.

The loss of the mounted troops was as follows:—Mounted Infantry, 2 men wounded severely; 1 man wounded slightly; 2 horses killed; 5 horses wounded. Volunteer Squadron, nil; Natal Horse, nil; Thausie's Native Horse, 1 man killed; Mafunzi's Native Horse, 1 man wounded severely.

The few casualties amongst the horses of the mounted troops, half of whom were outside the laager during the whole action, except the first half-hour, does not say much for the accuracy of the Zulu fire.

P. H. S. BARROW, Major,
Commanding Mounted Troops,
No. 1 Column.

Camp Gingindhlovo,
April 6, 1879.

ABOUT two hours after the action all the mounted troops made a reconnaissance for some six miles, but did not succeed in cutting off any of the enemy, who had fled in all directions.

Supplementary Return of Wounded in the Action at Zhibobana Hill (Col. Wood's Column), 28th March, 1879.

Frontier Light Horse—Sergeant J. Dews, severely.

JAMES L. HOLLOWAY,
Deputy Surgeon-General,
for Surg.-General absent on duty.

The Deputy-Adjutant-General,
&c., &c., &c.,
Durban.

Supplementary Return of Wounded in the Action at Kambula Hill (Col. Wood's Column), 29th March, 1879.

1st Battalion 13th foot—Private J. Cogan, slightly.

JAMES L. HOLLOWAY,
Deputy Surgeon-General,
for Surg.-General absent on duty.

The Deputy Adjutant-General,
&c., &c., &c.,
Durban.

(C.)

Return of Arms Captured at Gingilovo, 2nd April, 1879, by Relieving Column.

Martini-Henry Rifles, 5: 3 of 24th, 1 of 32nd, 1 unmarked; double fowling pieces, 4; revolvers, 1; guns and rifles (various), 425, mostly "Tower" and Prussian. Total, 435.

Return of Arms Captured at Kambula, 29th March, 1879, by No. 4 Column.

Martini-Henry rifles, 15: 9 of 1-24th, 2 of 2-24th, 4 of 80th; Enfield rifles, 19; 1 Snider carbine, R.A.; rifles and guns (various), 292, mostly "Tower" or Prussian. Total, 326.

Return of Horses Killed and Wounded in Action at Gingilovo, 2nd April, 1879.

Staff, 2 killed, private horse, Lieut.-Colonel Crealock; public do., Capt. Molyneux; Mounted Infantry, 2 killed, 5 wounded, private horse, Lieut. Courtenay, 20th Hussars; Transport Department, 1 killed; 5th Battalion Natal Native Contingent, 2 killed, 1 wounded, Capt. Gurney, Lieut. Jay, and Lieut. Thompson. Total, 7 killed, 6 wounded.

J. NORTH CREALOCK, Lieut.-Colonel,
Staff Officer.

No. 1 Column.

State of Column, Ekowe, 1st April, 1879.

Effective.

Staff—4 Officers, 2 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Naval Brigade—6 Officers, 143 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 11 | 7 Royal Artillery—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. No. 2 Company Royal Engineers—2 Officers, 77 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—16 Officers, 548 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—7 Officers, 317 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Officer, 18 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—3 Officers, 5 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Army Hospital Corps—5 Officers, 12 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Volunteers—8 Non-commissioned Officers and

Men. Native Pioneers—4 Officers, 98 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Contingent—3 Officers, 11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—25 Natives, 45 Officers, 1,150 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops—8 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Service—7 European Officers, 11 European Non-commissioned Officers and 123 Natives.

Sick in Hospital and Quarters.

Naval Brigade—1 Officer, 5 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. No. 2 Company Royal Engineers—2 Officers, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—1 Officer, 15 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—3 Officers, 10 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—1 Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Her Majesty's Troops—8 Officers, 37 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Attending Hospital.

Staff—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Naval Brigade—6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. No. 2 Company Royal Engineers—12 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—20 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—29 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Mounted Volunteers—3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—74 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops—3 Non-commissioned Officers.

Present Strength.

Staff—4 Officers, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Naval Brigade—7 Officers, 154 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 11 | 7 Royal Artillery—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. No. 2 Company Royal Engineers—4 Officers, 92 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—17 Officers, 583 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—10 Officers, 356 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—1 Officer, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—3 Officers, 6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Army Hospital Corps—5 Officers, 14 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Volunteers—11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Pioneers—4 Officers, 98 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Contingent—3 Officers, 11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—25 Natives, 53 Officers, 1,261 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops—11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Service—7 European Officers, 11 European Non-commissioned Officers, 123 Natives, In addition to these numbers, there were 164 conductors and drivers.

Increase—

From 99th Regiment, Mounted Infantry—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Total.

Mounted Infantry—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Decrease—Deceased.

Naval Brigade—1 Officer, 4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—2 Officers, 7 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—1 Officer, 8 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Non-com-

missioned Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Officers, 21 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Total.

Naval Brigade—1 Officer, 4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—2 Officers, 7 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—1 Officer, 8 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Officers, 21 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

To Mounted Infantry.

99th Regiment—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Total.

Staff—4 Officers, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Naval Brigade—8 Officers, 158 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 11 | 7 Royal Artillery—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. No. 2 Company Royal Engineers—4 Officers, 92 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—19 Officers, 590 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—11 Officers, 368 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Officer, 22 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—1 Officer, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—3 Officers, 6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Army Hospital Corps—5 Officers, 15 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Volunteers—11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Pioneers—4 Officers, 98 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Contingent—3 Officers, 11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men, 25 Natives. Her Majesty's Troops—57 Officers, 1,282 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops—11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Service—7 European Officers, 11 European Non-commissioned Officers, 123 Natives.

C. K. PEARSON, Colonel,
Commanding No. 1 Column.

No. 1 Column.

State of the Column at Ekowe on 3rd April, 1879.

Effective.

Staff—4 Officers, 2 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Naval Brigade—6 Officers, 142 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Artillery—1 Officer, 23 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Engineers—2 Officers, 77 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—16 Officers, 543 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—7 Officers, 316 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Officer, 21 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—3 Officers, 6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Army Hospital Corps—5 Officers, 13 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Volunteer Mounted Rifles—6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Pioneers—4 European Officers, 96 Natives. Native Contingent—2 European Officers, 8 European Non-commissioned Officers, 25 Natives. Her Majesty's Troops—45 Officers, 1,156 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops and Native Levies—20 Europeans, 121 Natives.

Sick in Hospital and Quarters.

Naval Brigade—1 Officer, 5 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Engineers—2 Offi-

cers, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—1 Officer, 17 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—3 Officers, 10 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—1 Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Volunteer Mounted Rifles—5 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—8 Officers, 29 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops and Native Levies—5 Europeans.

Attending Hospital.

Staff—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Naval Brigade—6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Artillery—2 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Engineers—12 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—23 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—30 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Native Contingent—1 European Officer, 3 European Non-commissioned Officers. Her Majesty's Troops—75 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops and Native Levies—4 Europeans.

Total.

Staff—4 Officers, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Naval Brigade—7 Officers, 153 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Artillery—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Engineers—4 Officers, 92 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—17 Officers, 583 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—10 Officers, 356 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—1 Officer, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—3 Officers, 6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Army Hospital Corps—5 Officers, 14 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Volunteer Mounted Rifles—11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Pioneers—4 European Officers, 96 Natives. Native Contingent—3 European Officers, 11 European Non-commissioned Officers, 25 Natives. Her Majesty's Troops—53 Officers, 1,260 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops and Native Levies—29 Europeans, 121 Natives. In garrison at Ekowe.

Increase.

From 99th Regiment.—Mounted Infantry—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Total Increase.

Mounted Infantry—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Decrease—Deceased.

Naval Brigade—1 Officer, 4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—2 Officers, 7 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—1 Officer, 8 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Officers, 21 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

To Mounted Infantry.

99th Regiment—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Total Decrease.

Naval Brigade—1 Officer, 4 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—2 Officers, 7 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—1 Officer, 12 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Army Hospital Corps—1 Non-commissioned Officer. Her Majesty's Troops—4 Officers, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

Strength on 27th January, 1879.

Staff—4 Officers, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Naval Brigade—8 Officers, 157 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Artillery—1 Officer, 25 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Royal Engineers—4 Officers, 92 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. The Buffs—19 Officers, 590 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 99th Regiment—11 Officers, 368 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Mounted Infantry—1 Officer, 22 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Commissariat Department—1 Officer, 3 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Transport Department—3 Officers, 6 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Army Hospital Corps—5 Officers, 15 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Volunteer Mounted Rifles—11 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Native Pioneers—4 European Officers, 96 Natives. Native Contingent—3 European Officers, 11 European Non-commissioned Officers, 25 Natives. Her Majesty's Troops—57 Officers, 1,281 Non-commissioned Officers and Men. Colonial Troops and Native Levies—29 Europeans, 121 Natives.

C. K. PEARSON, Colonel,
Commanding No. 1 Column.

No. 1 Column.

Nominal Roll of Deaths at Ekowe up to the 3rd April, 1879.

The Buffs—Captain H. J. M. Williams, 12th March; Lieutenant G. R. J. Evelyn, 30th March.

99th Regiment—Lieutenant Davidson, 27th March. Naval Brigade—Midshipman Coker, 16th March; Artificer J. Moore, 11th February; Seaman J. Radford, 7th March; Private Royal Marines W. Stagg, 17th March.

The Buffs—Private A. Kingston, 1st February; Private W. McLeod, 13th February; Private E. Oakley, 15th February; Lance-Corporal T. Taylor, 21st February; Drummer A. Mortimer, 6th March; Private J. Slack, 9th March; Private A. Tarrant, 27th March.

99th Regiment—Private W. Knee, 21st February, drowned; Private J. Shields, 21st February; Private J. Paul, 4th March; Private J. Tubb, 16th March; Private T. Venn, 17th March; Private W. Kent, 17th March, killed by Zulus when on vedette duty; Private C. Coombs, 21st March; Private W. Roden, 26th March; Private Lewis, 29th March.

Army Hospital Corps—Private W. Barker, 8th March.

Naval Brigade—Seaman A. Smith, 2nd April.

C. K. PEARSON, Colonel,
Commanding No. 1 Column.